Mortality Risk, Insurance, and the Value of Life*

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Abstract. A substantial body of research finds that consumers are far from fully annuitized, but the conventional economic theory on the value of life assumes otherwise. We develop and apply a new framework for valuing health and longevity improvements that relaxes this assumption, and describe several novel implications. First, in contrast to the conventional theory, a given mortality improvement may be worth more, not less, to patients facing shorter lives. This result helps reconcile economic theory with evidence that consumers prefer to award a fixed longevity gain to the patients with the bleakest survival prospects, and also implies that existing economic analysis may undervalue the treatment of severe illnesses relative to mild ones. Second, we introduce the value of statistical illness, which quantifies the value of preventing illness and includes the value of statistical life as a special case. Using detailed microdata, we calculate that treating illnesses such as cancer and heart disease is worth several times more to consumers than saving an equivalent number of life-years by preventing these conditions. Finally, we show that public annuity programs boost demand for life-extension. For instance, US Social Security adds $11.5 trillion (10.5 percent) to the current value of post-1940 longevity gains.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The economic analysis of risks to life and health has made enormous contributions to both academic discussions and public policy. Economists have used the standard tools of life-cycle consumption theory to propose a transparent framework that measures the value of improvements to both health and longevity. Economic concepts such as the value of statistical life play central roles in public policy discussions surrounding investments in medical care, public safety, environmental hazards, and countless other arenas.

The standard framework, however, assumes full annuitization and deterministic mortality risk. While analytically convenient and useful for illustrating some of the underlying economics, these assumptions are not realistic: it is well known that most people are far from fully annuitized (Brown et al. 2008), and that mortality risk changes over time according to one’s health state. Moreover, these assumptions hamper explanatory power in several ways: the standard framework cannot investigate what happens to the value of life upon falling ill, cannot meaningfully distinguish between preventive care and medical treatment, and glosses over policy-relevant relationships between the value of life and the structure of the annuity market.

This paper develops a general economic framework for valuing health improvements and applies it to data. We establish three main results. First, we derive conditions under which the value of life can rise following a negative health shock, and demonstrate that this effect is economically significant. For example, we calculate that the value of statistical life (VSL) for a 70-year-old soars by over $1 million (50 percent) following the development of chronic conditions that impair her everyday living. Second, we introduce the value of statistical illness (VSI), which captures the willingness-to-pay to avoid falling ill and includes VSL as a special case. We calculate that—holding wealth constant—a sick individual’s initial willingness-to-pay for medical treatments is several times greater than a healthy individual’s willingness-to-pay for equally effective preventive care. Third, we calculate that the US Social Security program adds $11.5 trillion (10.5 percent) to the value of post-1940 longevity gains.

Incomplete annuity markets drive all three of these results. A very simple example illustrates the intuition. Imagine a 60-year-old retiree with no bequest motive and a flat optimal consumption profile. If she fully annuitizes her savings, her consumption remains flat at, say, $30,000 annually. Now suppose she cannot annuitize any of her wealth. In this case, it is well known that the optimal consumption profile shifts forward (Yaari 1965), in response to the risk of dying with money still left in the bank (see Figure 1). Because VSL depends greatly on consumption, it too will shift forward. Thus, reductions in annuitization lower VSL at older ages. Conversely, public programs such as Social Security that increase annuitization rates will raise VSL at older ages.

Our other results follow from the simple observation that it is optimal for an incompletely annuitized individual to shift her consumption forward, i.e., to spend down her wealth, following an adverse shock to life expectancy. At least for some initial period of time, the shock increases consumption, and thus reduces the marginal utility of consumption. An important insight of our paper is that although a negative shock to survival always reduces lifetime utility, the accompanying reduction in the contemporaneous marginal utility of consumption can be large enough to cause VSL to increase even though life expectancy has fallen. Indeed, we show that VSL is frequently higher for an individual diagnosed with a more fatal illness. Similarly, a sick individual’s willingness to pay for treatment is frequently higher than a healthy individual’s willingness to pay for equally effective preventive care. This is in stark contrast to the conventional model with full annuitization, where a reduction in survival always reduces VSL.

The first half of this paper provides a formal framework that confirms these insights. We first demonstrate that consumption increases following an adverse mortality shock, and derive sufficient conditions under
which that shock also generates an accompanying increase in VSL. These conditions are satisfied by standard preferences such as CRRA. We focus on mortality shocks, but our framework allows for shocks to quality of life and income as well. We then show how our framework leads to a more general concept, the value of statistical illness, which can be interpreted as an individual’s willingness to pay to avoid a marginal increase in the risk of acquiring an illness. This allows us to compare the value of prevention to the value of treatment. In general, prevention and treatment are not valued equally unless consumers are fully annuitized. If preferences satisfy the same conditions that cause VSL to rise following a health shock, then the value of treatment exceeds the value of prevention for incompletely annuitized consumers. This result sheds new light on why consumers appear reluctant to invest in prevention, even when there are considerable social and private life expectancy benefits (Dranove 1998).

The second half of the paper applies our model to data. Our first set of empirical exercises incorporates detailed microsimulation data from the Future Elderly Model into a stochastic life-cycle model that allows mortality and quality of life to vary across 20 different health states. Using reasonable parameters, we demonstrate that our surprising theoretical result—that VSL can rise when life expectancy falls—is economically significant. For instance, we calculate that VSL soars from $2.9 million to $4.3 million for a 70-year-old who suffers a debilitating health shock that reduces her life expectancy by nearly 7 years and worsens her quality of life. This relationship between health shocks and VSL generates substantial variability in the aggregate: a Monte Carlo simulation of a set of initially healthy, identical 50-year-olds predicts that stochastic health shocks generate an inter-vigintile (middle 90 percent) VSL range of $4.2 to $5.3 million by age 60. In addition, we show that longevity gains are more valuable in states with lower remaining life expectancy. Finally, we calculate that the value of treating life-threatening conditions like cancer is worth up to 10 times more than equivalent preventive treatments that add the same number of years to an individual’s life expectancy. Our results are robust to including stochastic wealth shocks and a bequest motive.

Our second exercise illustrates the connections between public annuity programs and the societal value of mortality reductions, defined as individuals’ private willingness-to-pay for life-extension plus the effect of life-extension on expected future consumption and income. We calculate that the US Social Security program adds $11.5 trillion (10.5 percent) to the value of post-1940 longevity gains by raising the value of life at older ages. This gain is worth over $35,000 per person to the current population, or about half as much as the longevity insurance value of Social Security. Moreover, Social Security increases the aggregate value of reducing future mortality risks by over 10 percent, so that a 1 percent reduction in population-wide mortality is $138 billion more valuable than it would have been without the program. Increasing the size of Social Security pensions by 50 percent would add a further $72 billion of value to this mortality decline. Finally, we show that a strong bequest motive reduces the effect of Social Security on the value of life by half. This suggests the effect of annuitization on the value of life matters most for low-income individuals, who are less likely to have a significant bequest motive.

The economic literature on the value of life reaches back to Schelling (1968) and includes seminal studies by Arthur (1981), Rosen (1988), Murphy and Topel (2006), and Hall and Jones (2007). A few studies have considered departures from the assumption of full annuitization, but only under specialized preferences (Shepard and Zeckhauser 1984; Ehrlich 2000; Ehrlich and Yin 2005). Our framework builds on this literature by providing expressions for VSL under general preferences. We also extend the

1 The sign depends on whether the loss in lifetime utility is offset by a corresponding decrease in marginal utility. Specifically, an adverse mortality shock increases VSL when demand for current consumption is sufficiently inelastic, or when the marginal utility of demand is sufficiently linear.
conventional model to accommodate stochastic health shocks. Our more general setting leads to our novel finding that VSL can rise following a health shock, and allows us to introduce the concept of VSI to the literature. To our knowledge, we provide the first economic life-cycle analysis of the value of preventing disease.

Our findings have two significant implications for cost-effectiveness analysis, which governs the allocation of healthcare resources in many “single-payer” countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada (Dranitsaris and Papadopoulos 2015) and continues to grow in importance in the multi-payer US healthcare marketplace (Goldman, Nussbaum, and Linthicum 2016). First, conventional cost-effectiveness analysis assumes that the value of extending life is insensitive to the severity of illness: providing X aggregate life-years by extending life a little for a large population of hypertension patients is worth the same as providing X aggregate life-years by extending life substantially for a proportionally smaller population of cancer patients. This equivalence is incorrect in our framework (unless individuals are completely annuitized), which suggests that the cost-effectiveness approach underinvests in the treatment of the most life-threatening illnesses relative to less severe conditions. This insight is consistent with data on how consumers view the value of life-extension (Nord et al. 1995; Green and Gerard 2009; Linley and Hughes 2013), and can better inform the way economists and healthcare payers assess the value of medical technologies.

Second, cost-effectiveness analysis traditionally values life-years gained by prevention and treatment equally (Drummond et al. 2005a). However, in our model baseline health status affects the value of life-years gained, which creates a wedge between prevention and treatment. In contrast to the old Benjamin Franklin adage, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” (Labaree 1960), we find that treatment is frequently much more valuable to consumers than prevention, even when they produce the same longevity gain. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility of positive externalities, such as the “herd immunity” of vaccines or the relative cost-effectiveness of prevention versus treatment. Rather, it implies that longevity gains are more valuable when gained through treatment instead of prevention.²

Section II reviews the predictions of the conventional theory on the value of life and demonstrates how relaxing its assumption of full annuitization alters these predictions. Section III then generalizes the framework further by allowing health and income to be stochastic. Section IV presents empirical analysis that: (1) shows how health shocks can increase the value of statistical life; (2) illustrates how more severe health shocks cause consumers to place higher value on a given mortality reduction; (3) calculates the value of preventing different kinds of illness; and (4) quantifies the effect of Social Security on the value of statistical life. Section V concludes.

II. THE VALUE OF LIFE WHEN MORTALITY IS DETERMINISTIC
Consider an individual who faces a mortality risk. We are interested in analyzing the value of a marginal reduction in this risk. We first quantify this value in the conventional setting where markets are complete and the consumer has access to actuarially fair annuities (Rosen 1988; Murphy and Topel 2006). We then repeat this exercise in a “Robinson Crusoe” economy where the consumer cannot purchase annuities to insure against her uncertain lifetime (Shepard and Zeckhauser 1984; Ehrlich 2000; Johansson 2002). We compare our findings for these two polar cases to illustrate the basic insights of the paper. We focus on improvements in longevity and their relationship to annuity insurance markets, but allow for

² This valuation differential depends on the individual’s current health state and is therefore most relevant for assessing the value of current medical R&D. The difference in the values of preventives and treatments introduced in the distant future is negligible because they are necessarily valued from an ex ante (healthy) perspective.
improvements in quality of life as well. Section III then extends the model to accommodate stochastic mortality and introduces the value of statistical illness.

Although it is optimal for a consumer to fully annuitize, real-world annuitization rates are quite low. This “annuity puzzle” is the subject of numerous papers. Many explanations have been suggested, but there is no consensus on what drives incomplete annuitization (Brown et al. 2008). Our study takes the low rate of annuitization as a given empirical fact and illustrates its significance for the value of life. Section IV uses a numerical model to probe the sensitivity of our results to different assumptions about consumer preferences, such as the presence of a bequest motive, which prior studies have argued might rationalize low observed rates of annuitization. There continues to be debate over why real-world consumption profiles and annuity purchase decisions look the way they do. However, as we show, the implications for life-extension depend primarily on the real-world consumption profiles themselves, not the reasons that lie beneath.

Like prior studies on the value of life, we focus throughout this paper on the demand for health and longevity. Quantifying optimal health spending requires additionally modeling the supply of health care (Hall and Jones 2007).

II.A. The fully annuitized value of life

Let \(c(t)\) be consumption at time \(t\), \(W_0\) be baseline wealth, \(m(t)\) be exogenously determined income, \(\rho\) be the rate of time preference, and \(r\) be the rate of interest.\(^3\) Let \(W\) be the net present value of wealth and future earnings at baseline. Finally, define \(q(t)\) as health-related quality of life at time \(t\). Since it sacrifices little generality in our application, we take the life-cycle quality of life profile \(q(t)\) as exogenous. As needed, one can consider any relevant quality of life profile in concert with a given profile of mortality, and we investigate this issue in our empirical analysis later. The maximum lifespan of a consumer is \(\tau\), and her mortality (hazard) rate at any point in time is given by \(\mu(t)\), where \(0 \leq t \leq T\). The probability that a consumer will be alive at time \(t\) is:

\[
S(t) = \exp\left[-\int_0^t \mu(s)ds\right]
\]

At time \(t = 0\), the consumer fully annuitizes. We assume that annuitization is actuarially fair. The consumer’s maximization problem is:

\[
V(0) = \max_{c(t)} \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} S(t) u(c(t), q(t)) dt
\]

subject to:

\[
\int_0^T e^{-rt} S(t) c(t) dt = W = W_0 + \int_0^T e^{-rt} S(t) m(t) dt
\]

The consumer’s utility function, \(u(c(t), q(t))\), depends on both consumption and health-related quality of life. We assume \(u(\cdot)\) is strictly increasing and concave in its first argument, and twice continuously differentiable. Let \(u_c(\cdot)\) denote the marginal utility of consumption. Associating the multiplier \(\theta\) with the wealth constraint, optimal consumption is characterized by the first-order condition:

\[
\frac{\partial V(0)}{\partial W} = \theta = e^{(r-\rho)T} u_c(c(t), q(t))
\]

\(^3\) It is straightforward to incorporate endogenous labor supply (Murphy and Topel 2006). In the stochastic mortality model presented in Section III, we allow income to depend on the health state.
To analyze the value of life, let $\delta(t)$ be a perturbation on the mortality rate with $\int_0^T \delta(t)dt = 1$, and consider

$$S^\varepsilon(t) = \exp \left[ - \int_0^t (\mu(s) - \varepsilon \delta(s))ds \right], \varepsilon > 0$$

Let $c^\varepsilon(t)$ represent the equilibrium variation in $c(t)$ caused by this perturbation. As shown in Rosen (1988), the marginal utility of this life-extension is given by

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial \varepsilon} \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} S^\varepsilon(t)u(c^\varepsilon(t), q(t))dt \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} = \int_0^T \left[ e^{-\rho t}u(c(t), q(t)) + e^{-\rho t} \theta(m(t) - c(t)) \left[ \int_0^t \delta(s)ds \right] S(t)dt \right]$$

The marginal value of life-extension is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between longer life and wealth:

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial \varepsilon} / \frac{\partial V}{\partial W} = \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} S(t) \left( \frac{u(c(t), q(t))}{u_e(c(t), q(t))} + m(t) - c(t) \right) \left[ \int_0^t \delta(s)ds \right] dt \tag{1}$$

The value of a life-year is the value of a one-period change in survival from the perspective of current time:

$$v(t) = \frac{u(c(t), q(t))}{u_e(c(t), q(t))} + m(t) - c(t) \tag{2}$$

The value of a life-year, $v(t)$, is equal to the value of consumption in that year plus net savings, $m(t) - c(t)$. The net savings term is a consequence of the requirement that annuities be actuarially fair. The value of a life-year can be rewritten as:

$$v(t) = m(t) + c(t) \left( \frac{u(c(t), q(t))}{c(t)u_e(c(t), q(t))} - 1 \right) = m(t) + c(t)\phi(c, q)$$

where $\phi(c, q)$ represents the consumer surplus value per unit of consumption. It is positive if average utility exceeds marginal utility. A life-year thus adds value through two different channels: an increase in earnings, $m(t)$, which can finance additional consumption, and an increase in consumer surplus, $c(t)\phi(c, q)$.

A canonical choice for $\delta(\cdot)$ in equation (1) is the Dirac delta function, so that the mortality rate is perturbed at $t = 0$ and remains unaffected otherwise. This then yields an expression that is commonly called the value of statistical life (VSL):

$$VSL \equiv \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} S(t)v(t)dt \tag{3}$$

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4 Positive consumer surplus may require that consumption remain above a “subsistence” level, $c \geq 0$. 
VSL corresponds to the value that the individual places on a marginal reduction in risk of death in the current period. For example, it is the amount that 1,000 people would be collectively willing to pay to eliminate a current risk that is expected to kill one of them. It is equal to the present discounted value of lifetime consumption, plus the change in net savings. Holding wealth constant, VSL increases with survival, which implies increasing returns in health improvements (Murphy and Topel 2006). Conversely, this leads to the conventional result that VSL falls when mortality rises.

The value of statistical life depends on how substitutable consumption is at different ages, i.e., on how easily an individual can reallocate consumption over time. Intuitively, if present consumption is a good substitute for future consumption, then living longer is less valuable. Define the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, \( \sigma \), as:

\[
\frac{1}{\sigma} \equiv -\frac{u_{cc}c}{u_c}
\]

In addition, define the elasticity of quality of life with respect to the marginal utility of consumption as:

\[
\eta \equiv \frac{u_{cq}q}{u_c}
\]

When this term is positive, the marginal utility of consumption is higher in healthier states, and vice-versa. Taking logarithms of the first-order condition for consumption and differentiating with respect to time yields the rate of change for consumption over the life cycle:

\[
\frac{\dot{c}}{c} = \sigma(r - \rho) + \sigma\eta\frac{\dot{q}}{q}
\]

If one assumes that \( r = \rho \), and that the marginal utility of consumption is higher when health status is better, then life-cycle consumption will have the inverted U-shape observed in real-world data.\(^5\)

A crucial feature of the conventional model is that consumption growth over the life-cycle is independent of mortality risk, because the individual is fully insured against that risk. This feature in turn implies that the rate of change in the value of a life-year is also not a function of mortality risk:

\[
\frac{\dot{v}}{v} = \left( \frac{1}{\sigma v u_c} \right) \frac{\dot{c}}{c} + \left( -\eta \frac{u}{v u_c} + \frac{q u q}{v u_c}/q \right) \frac{\dot{q}}{q} + \frac{\dot{m}}{v}
\]

In sum, we have identified two major features of the conventional, fully annuitized and deterministic model of mortality:

- The relative value of a life-year within a lifetime is independent of mortality risk.
- The value of statistical life falls when mortality rises.

**II.B. The uninsured value of life**

To illustrate the effects of annuitization, we consider a model without any annuitization possibilities. In our numerical exercises later, we will consider various partial annuitization schemes. To characterize the

\(^5\) Consumption climbs early in life as the benefits to savings diminish. It declines later in life when quality of life deteriorates. This inverted U-shape for the age profile of consumption has been widely documented across different countries and goods (Carroll and Summers 1991; Banks, Blundell, and Tanner 1998; Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger 2007).
model without annuitization, we employ the Yaari (1965) model of consumption behavior under mortality risk. Let the state variable \( W(t) \) represents current wealth at time \( t \). The consumer’s maximization problem is:

\[
V(0, W(0)) = \max_{c(t)} \int_0^T e^{-rt} S(t) u(c(t), q(t)) dt
\]

s. t. \( W(0) = W_0 \),

\[
W(t) \geq 0, W(T) = 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial W(t)}{\partial t} = rW(t) + m(t) - c(t)
\]

If the non-negative wealth constraint binds, then the solution to the consumer’s problem is to set \( c(t) = m(t) \). Otherwise, the solution is to maximize subject to the constraint on the law of motion for wealth. We focus here on the latter, nontrivial case.

Optimal consumption is again characterized by the first-order condition:

\[
\frac{\partial V(0, W(0))}{\partial W(0)} = \theta = e^{(r-p)t} S(t) u_c(c(t), q(t))
\]

Unlike in the case of perfect markets, the survival function enters the consumer’s first-order condition for optimal consumption. Instead of setting the discounted marginal utility of consumption equal to the marginal utility of wealth, the consumer sets the expected discounted marginal utility of consumption at time \( t \) equal to the marginal utility of wealth. This effectively shifts consumption to earlier ages in the life-cycle. This is rational because consumption allocated to later time periods will not be enjoyed in the event of an early death.

The expression for the marginal utility of life-extension is:

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \varepsilon} \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \int_0^T e^{-rt} S^\varepsilon(t) u(c^\varepsilon(t), q(t)) dt \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0}
\]

\[
= \int_0^T e^{-rt} \left[ \int_0^t \delta(s) ds \right] S(t) u(c(t), q(t)) dt + \int_0^T e^{-rt} S(t) u_c(c(t), q(t)) \frac{\partial c^\varepsilon(t)}{\partial \varepsilon} \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} dt
\]

\[
= \int_0^T e^{-rt} \left[ \int_0^t \delta(s) ds \right] S(t) u(c(t), q(t)) dt + \theta \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \int_0^T e^{-rt} c^\varepsilon(t) dt
\]

where the last equality follows from application of the budget constraint.\(^6\)

Dividing this result by the marginal utility of wealth, \( \theta \), then yields the marginal value of life-extension:

\[
\frac{\partial V/\partial \varepsilon}{\partial V/\partial W} = \int_0^T e^{-rt} \left[ \int_0^t \delta(s) ds \right] S(t) \frac{u(c(t), q(t))}{u_c(c(0), q(0))} dt
\]

\(^6\) The budget constraint \( W(T) = 0 \) implies \( \int_0^T e^{-rt} c^\varepsilon(t) dt = W_0 + \int_0^T e^{-rt} m(t) dt \), a value which does not depend on survival and thus is unaffected by life extension.
In this setting, the value of a life-year from the perspective of current time is:

\[ v(t) = \frac{u(c(t), q(t))}{u_c(c(t), q(t))} \quad (6) \]

When the consumer is uninsured, the value of a life-year depends only on the value of consumption. The net savings term is absent in equation (6) because life-extension has no effect on the consumer’s budget constraint.\(^7\)

Choosing again the Dirac delta function for \( \delta(\cdot) \) yields an expression for VSL that differs from the perfect markets case:

\[ VSL = \int_0^T e^{-rt} v(t) dt \quad (7) \]

The value of statistical life is proportional to (expected) lifetime utility, and inversely proportional to the marginal utility of consumption. It is well known that removing annuity markets lowers lifetime utility (Yaari 1965). As we show more formally below, removing these markets also shifts consumption to earlier ages, thereby lowering the marginal utility of consumption, at least at those ages. When consumers shift consumption forward, the near-term life-years rise in value but distant life-years fall in value. Thus, the net effect of annuity markets on VSL is in general ambiguous. Put differently, exposure to longevity risk does not necessarily lower VSL. In the next section, we will show that this basic insight extends to exposing a consumer to a mortality “shock.” We emphasize that in both cases the result depends critically on whether consumers are fully annuitized.

Unlike the perfect markets case, the life-cycle consumption profile of the non-annuitized individual depends explicitly on mortality risk. Taking logarithms of the first-order condition for consumption and differentiating with respect to time yields:

\[ \frac{\dot{c}}{c} = \sigma(r - \rho) + \sigma \eta \frac{\dot{q}}{q} - \sigma \mu(t) \quad (8) \]

Comparing this result to the standard case, given by equation (4), reveals both similarities and differences. As in the standard, fully annuitized model, the non-annuitized consumption profile described by equation (8) changes shape when the rate of time preference is above or below the rate of interest and when the quality of life changes. Unlike in the standard model, the consumption profile described by equation (8) depends explicitly on the mortality rate, \( \mu(t) \). Higher rates of mortality depress the rate of consumption growth over the life-cycle. This rate of growth is always higher in the fully annuitized case, in which the last term drops out of the consumption growth equation (8). Put another way, removing the annuity market “pulls consumption earlier” in the life-cycle.

An appealing feature of the uninsured model is that it generates an inverted U-shape for the profile of consumption under quite natural assumptions. Low income early in life and high mortality risk later in

\(^7\) Unless the consumer survives until period \( T \), she will die with positive wealth. Although this remaining wealth has no value to an individual with no bequest motive, it may be of value to society. When calculating the social value of life-extension, we account for the effect of increased longevity on bequests by including a net savings term, defined to be the expected increase in future earnings net of consumption, as in equation (2). This term reflects the external effect on society’s aggregate wealth due to increased longevity.
life are sufficient conditions for the inverted U-shape consumption profile. One need not impose the ad hoc assumptions on the signs of \( r - \rho \) or \( \eta \) that are necessary in the fully annuitized model (Murphy and Topel 2006).

The life-cycle profile of the value of a life-year is:

\[
\frac{\dot{v}}{v} = \left( \frac{1}{\sigma} + \frac{\dot{v}}{v} \right) \frac{\dot{c}}{c} + \left( \frac{q u_a}{u} - \eta \right) \frac{\dot{q}}{q} \tag{9}
\]

An important implication of (9) is that willingness to pay for longevity depends on the life-cycle mortality profile because of its dependence on the rate of change in consumption. Holding quality of life constant, it is evident from equation (6) that increases in the mortality rate—which shift consumption forward—will raise \( v \), the current value of a life-year. That is, mortality also shifts forward the value of life. All else equal, individuals who face high mortality risks will pay more for a marginal (near-term) life-year, but less for a distant life-year, than healthy peers who face low mortality risks. This differs from the implications of the conventional model, in which higher mortality reduces the values of life-years but has no impact on their relative values.

At the aggregate level, as societies become richer and live longer, the fraction of wealth spent on health will depend not just on the income elasticity of health, but also on the degree of survival uncertainty they face. Furthermore, our results imply that public programs that increase annuitization rates, such as Social Security, will affect society’s willingness to pay for longevity, thereby creating a feedback loop that could dampen or increase program expenditures.\(^8\) In our numerical exercises, we will quantify how the degree of annuitization influences the value of statistical life.

To summarize the findings for this uninsured model, we have identified the following two properties that contrast with those of the fully annuitized model:

- The values of near-term life-years rise, and distant life-years fall, when mortality rises.
- The value of statistical life may rise or fall when mortality rises.

In the next section, we allow mortality to be stochastic so that we can investigate formally the effect of disease and other health shocks on the value of life. Before turning to that analysis, we pause to note that suffering a health shock is similar to removing access to annuity markets, which exposes an individual to mortality risk. We have shown here that this shifts the value of life-years forward, with an ambiguous net effect on VSL. As we shall see, health shocks have a similar effect.

### III. THE VALUE OF LIFE WHEN MORTALITY IS STOCHASTIC

The previous analysis demonstrates that mortality risk affects the value of life when annuity markets are incomplete. Prior studies have overlooked this relationship by assuming complete annuitization. However, the conventional framework is ill-equipped to study the influence of mortality risk for another reason as well. Prior analysis, just like our deterministic model above, treats the mortality rate as a nonrandom parameter (Murphy and Topel, 2006). Thus, shifts in mortality risk reflect preordained and anticipated changes in mortality. In the real world, however, neither the timing nor the size of shifts in mortality risk is known. As a related matter, the conventional framework does not allow for different health states. This omission precludes a meaningful analysis of the value of preventing health deterioration.

\(^8\) Philipson and Becker (1998) make the important, but distinct, point that the moral hazard effects of public annuity programs also increase an individual’s willingness to pay for longevity gains.
This section extends our analysis to allow for stochastic mortality. Specifically, we assume that the mortality rate now depends on the individual’s health state. Let $Y_t$ be a continuous-time Markov chain with finite state space $Y = \{1, 2, ..., n\}$. Denote the transition intensities by:

$$\lambda_{ij}(t) = \lim_{h \to 0} \frac{1}{h} \mathbb{P}[Y_{t+h} = j | Y_t = i], j \neq i,$$

$$\lambda_i(t) = - \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t)$$

The mortality rate at time $t$ is defined as

$$\mu(t) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \bar{\mu}_j(t) \mathbf{1}\{Y_t = j\}$$

where $\{\bar{\mu}_j(t)\}$ are exogenous and $\mathbf{1}\{Y_t = j\}$ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual is in state $j$ at time $t$ and 0 otherwise. Without meaningful loss of generality, we assume that individuals can transition only to higher-numbered states, i.e., $\lambda_{ij}(t) = 0$ if $j < i$, so that the probability that a consumer in state $i$ at time 0 remains in state $i$ at time $t$ is equal to.

$$S(i, t) = \exp \left[ - \int_0^t \left( \bar{\mu}_i(s) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \right) ds \right]$$

A complete annuities market allows the consumer to insure fully against mortality risk even when mortality is stochastic. Appendix C provides a full derivation for a setting with complete markets and demonstrates that stochastic mortality, by itself, does not alter the theoretical predictions of the standard VSL model as long as one maintains the assumption of full annuitization. Appendix C also derives expressions for the value of preventing illness when the consumer is fully annuitized. We defer discussion of those results until later in this section.

Here, we focus on the uninsured case. The consumer’s maximization problem is:

$$V(0, W(0), Y_0) = \max_{c_{Y_t}(t)} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-pt} S(t) u(c_{Y_t}(t), q_{Y_t}(t)) dt \middle| Y_0 \right]$$

s. t. $W(0) = W_0$,

$$W(t) \geq 0, W(T) = 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial W(t)}{\partial t} = rW(t) + m_{Y_t}(t) - c_{Y_t}(t)$$

---

9 That is, an individual can transition from state $i$ to $j$, $i < j$, but not vice versa. This does not meaningfully limit the generality of our model, because one can always define a new state $k > j$ where $\bar{\mu}_k(t) = \bar{\mu}_j(t)\forall t$.

10 Reichling and Smetters (2015) show that when annuity markets are incomplete, stochastic mortality and correlated medical costs can explain the puzzling observation that many households do not fully annuitize their wealth. They take the positive correlation between health shocks and medical spending as a given. Our study provides a reason why these two phenomena are positively correlated.
As in the deterministic model presented in Section II.B, we focus on the non-trivial case where the non-negative wealth constraint does not bind. Define the consumer’s objective function at time $t$ as:

$$
T(\varphi_t, q_{u+t}) = \min_{\varepsilon, \delta} \exp(-\mu(u + t) dt ) u(c_{u+t}, q_{u+t}(u + t)) dt
$$

We can then write the objective function recursively as:

$$
T(\varphi_t, q_{u+t}) = \min_{\varepsilon, \delta} \exp(-\mu(u + t) dt ) \left( u(c_{u+t}, q_{u+t}(u + t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(u + t) T(u + t, j) \right) dt
$$

Define the optimal value function as:

$$
V(t, W(t), i) = \max_{c(t), s \in T} \{ T(t, i) \}
$$

Under conventional regularity conditions, we know that if $V$ and its partial derivatives are continuous, then $V$ satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) system of equations:

$$
\left( \rho + \bar{m}(t) \right) V(t, W(t), i) = \max_{c(t)} \left\{ u(c(t), q(t)) + \frac{\partial V(t, W(t), i)}{\partial W(t)} [rW(t) + m(t) - c(t)] + \frac{\partial V(t, W(t), i)}{\partial t} + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) [V(t, W(t), j) - V(t, W(t), i)] \right\}, i = 1, ..., n
$$

We are interested in understanding how optimal consumption, and thus the value of life, changes over the life-cycle in this problem. We follow Parpas and Webster (2013), who demonstrate that it is possible to reformulate a stochastic optimization problem as a deterministic problem that takes $V(t, W(t), j), j \neq i$, as exogenous. This then allows us to apply the Pontryagin maximum principle and derive analytic expressions.

**Lemma 1:**

The optimal value function for $Y_0 = i, V(0, W(0), i)$, for the following deterministic optimization problem also satisfies the HJB given by (12), for each $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$:

$$
V(0, W_0, i) = \max_{c(t)} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} S(i, t) \left( u(c(t), q(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) dt \right]
$$

s.t. $\frac{\partial W(t)}{\partial t} = rW(t) + m(t) - c(t)$

where $V(t, W(t), j)$ are taken as exogenous.

**Proof of Lemma 1:** see Appendix A

Following Bertsekas (2005), the present value Hamiltonian corresponding to (13) is

$$
H(W(t), c(t), p_t(i)) = e^{-\rho t} S(i, t) \left( u(c(t), q(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) + p_t(i) [rW(t) - c(t) + m(t)]
$$
where \( p_t^{(i)} \) is the costate variable for state \( i \). The necessary costate equation is:

\[
p_t^{(i)} = -p_t^{(i)} r - e^{-\rho t} \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) \frac{\partial V(t, W(t), j)}{\partial W(t)}
\]

The solution to the costate equation can be obtained using the variation of the constant method:

\[
p_t^{(i)} = \left[ \int_t^T e^{(r-\rho)s} S(i, s) \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \frac{\partial V(s, W(s), j)}{\partial W(s)} ds \right] e^{-rt} + \theta^{(i)} e^{-rt}
\]

where \( \theta^{(i)} \) is a constant. The necessary first-order condition for consumption is:

\[
p_t^{(i)} = e^{-\rho t} S(i, t) u_c(c_i(t), q_i(t))
\]  \hspace{1cm} (14)

where the marginal utility of wealth at time \( t = 0 \) is \( \frac{\partial V(0, W_0, i)}{\partial W_0} = p_0^{(i)} = u_c(c_i(0), q_i(0)) \). Since the Hamiltonian is concave in \( c \) and linear in \( W \), the necessary conditions for optimality are also sufficient (Seierstad and Sydsaeter 1977).

To analyze the value of life, we let \( \delta(t) \) be a perturbation on the mortality rate in state \( i \) with \( \int_0^T \delta(t) dt = 1 \) and consider

\[
\bar{S}^\varepsilon(i, t) = \exp \left[ - \int_0^t (\bar{\mu}_t(s) - \varepsilon \delta(s)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) ds \right], \text{where } \varepsilon > 0
\]

We first derive an expression for the effect of this perturbation on expected lifetime utility.

**Lemma 2:**

The marginal utility of life extension in state \( i \) is equal to:

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \varepsilon} \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} = \int_0^T \left[ e^{-\rho t} \left( \int_0^t \delta(s) ds \right) \bar{S}(i, t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) \right] dt
\]

**Proof of Lemma 2:**

From (13), the marginal utility of life-extension is

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \varepsilon} \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t (\mu(s) - \varepsilon \delta(s)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) ds \right\} \left( u(c^\varepsilon_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W^\varepsilon(t), j) \right) dt \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0}
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
&= \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \left( \int_0^t \delta(s) ds \right) \tilde{S}(i, t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) dt \\
&\quad + \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \tilde{S}(i, t) \left( u_c(c_i(t), q_i(t)) \frac{\partial c_i^f(t)}{\partial \epsilon} + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) \frac{\partial V(t, W(t), j)}{\partial W} \frac{\partial W^e(t)}{\partial \epsilon} \right) dt \bigg|_{\epsilon=0}
\end{align*}
\]

where \( c_i^f(t) \) and \( W^e(t) \) represent the equilibrium variations in \( c_i(t) \) and \( W(t) \) caused by this perturbation.

We conclude the proof by showing that the second term in the last equality is equal to 0. Note that along this path, wealth at time \( t \) is equal to

\[
W(t) = W_0 e^{rt} + \int_0^t e^{r(t-s)} m_i(s) ds - \int_0^t e^{r(t-s)} c_i(s) ds,
\]

which implies

\[
\frac{\partial W^e(t)}{\partial \epsilon} = -\int_0^t e^{r(t-s)} \frac{\partial c_i^f(s)}{\partial \epsilon} ds.
\]

From the solution to the costate equation, we know that

\[
e^{-\rho t} \tilde{S}(i, t) u_c(c_i(t), q_i(t)) = \left[ \int_t^T e^{(r-\rho)s} \tilde{S}(i, s) \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \frac{\partial V(s, W(s), j)}{\partial W(s)} ds \right] e^{-rt} + \theta^{(i)} e^{-rt}
\]

Thus, we can rewrite the second term in the expression for \( \frac{\partial V}{\partial \epsilon} \big|_{\epsilon=0} \) above as

\[
\int_0^T \left[ \int_t^T e^{(r-\rho)s} \tilde{S}(i, s) \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \frac{\partial V(s, W(s), j)}{\partial W(s)} ds + \theta^{(i)} \right] e^{-rt} \frac{\partial c_i^f(t)}{\partial \epsilon} dt
\]

\[
- \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \tilde{S}(i, t) \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) \frac{\partial V(t, W(t), j)}{\partial W} \int_0^t e^{r(t-s)} \frac{\partial c_i^f(s)}{\partial \epsilon} ds dt \bigg|_{\epsilon=0}
\]

\[
= \int_0^T \left[ \int_t^T e^{(r-\rho)s} \tilde{S}(i, s) \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \frac{\partial V(s, W(s), j)}{\partial W(s)} ds \right] e^{-rt} \frac{\partial c_i^f(t)}{\partial \epsilon} dt
\]

\[
- \int_0^T \left[ \int_t^T e^{(r-\rho)s} \tilde{S}(i, s) \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \frac{\partial V(s, W(s), j)}{\partial W(s)} ds \right] e^{-rt} \frac{\partial c_i^f(t)}{\partial \epsilon} dt + \int_0^T \theta^{(i)} e^{-rt} \frac{\partial c_i^f(t)}{\partial \epsilon} dt \bigg|_{\epsilon=0}
\]

\[
= \theta^{(i)} \frac{\partial}{\partial \epsilon} \int_0^T e^{-rt} c_i^f(t) dt \bigg|_{\epsilon=0}
\]

\[
= 0
\]

QED

In order to facilitate comparison to the deterministic case, it is useful to derive an expression for the marginal utility of wealth at time \( t \).

**Lemma 3:**

The expected marginal utility of wealth in state \( i \) at time \( t \) is equal to:
\[
\frac{\partial V(t, W(t), i)}{\partial W(t)} = u_c(c_i(t), q_i(t)) = \mathbb{E} \left[ e^{(r-\rho)(r-t)} \exp \left\{ -\int_t^T \mu(s) ds \right\} u_c(c_{\tau}(\tau), q_{\tau}(\tau)) \right] Y_t = i
\]

**Proof of Lemma 3:** see Appendix A

Our next result demonstrates that the value of statistical life takes the same basic form as in the deterministic case.

**Proposition 4:**

Choosing once again the Dirac delta function for \( \delta(\cdot) \) simplifies the expression for the marginal utility of life-extension:

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \xi \mid \xi = 0} = \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} S(i, t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) dt
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} S(t) u(c_{\tau}(\tau), q_{\tau}(\tau)) dt \right] Y_0 = i
\]

Dividing the result by the marginal utility of wealth at time \( t = 0 \) and then applying Lemma 3 shows that the value of statistical life takes the same basic form as in the deterministic case:

\[
VSL(i) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} S(t) \frac{u(c_{\tau}(t), q_{\tau}(t))}{u_c(c_{\tau}(0), q_{\tau}(0))} dt \right] Y_0 = i = \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} v(i, t) dt
\]

(15)

where the value of a statistical life-year is equal to the expected utility of consumption normalized by the expected marginal utility of consumption:

\[
v(i, t) = \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[ S(t) u \left( c_{\tau}(t), q_{\tau}(t) \right) \right] Y_0 = i}{\mathbb{E} \left[ S(t) u_c \left( c_{\tau}(t), q_{\tau}(t) \right) \right] Y_0 = i}
\]

**Proof of Proposition 4:** see Appendix A

As before, the value of statistical life is proportional to the expected discounted (lifetime) utility of consumption, and inversely proportional to the marginal utility of consumption. As we shall show below, a negative health shock increases current consumption, causing the net effect on VSL to be ambiguous. This parallels the result we showed previously that removing access to annuitization, thereby exposing a consumer to mortality risk, has an ambiguous effect on VSL.

We can derive an expression for the life-cycle profile of consumption from (14), the first-order condition for \( p_t \). Differentiating with respect to \( t \), plugging in the result for the costate equation and its solution, and rearranging yields

\[
\frac{\dot{c}_i}{c_i} = \sigma (r - \rho) + \sigma \eta \frac{\dot{q}}{q} - \sigma \bar{\mu}_i(t) - \sigma \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) \left[ 1 - \frac{u_c(c_j(t), q_j(t))}{u_c(c_i(t), q_i(t))} \right]
\]

(16)

As in the deterministic case, the rate of change is a declining function of the individual’s current mortality rate, \( \bar{\mu}_i(t) \): removing the annuity market “pulls consumption earlier” in the life-cycle. Unlike in the deterministic case, there is now an additional source of mortality risk, captured by the fourth term in
equation (16). This term represents the possibility that the consumer might transition to a different health state in the future, and shifts consumption further still if the consumer is likely to fall ill in the future.

We caution that equation (16) is specific to an individual’s health state $i$, and cannot be easily aggregated across health states. That is, one cannot infer from equation (16) whether stochastic mortality on average causes consumption to shift forward relative to deterministic mortality. That said, one should expect stochastic mortality to shift consumption forward by less than in the deterministic case. Intuitively, this is because a stochastic environment allows an individual to react to unanticipated health shocks by adjusting her consumption. Put differently, a deterministic model is equivalent to a stochastic model where the consumer is forced to keep consumption constant across states. Consumers prefer the ability to adjust consumption, so that they can consume less in healthy states and more in sick states. We have confirmed this intuition in (unreported) empirical exercises that assume CRRA utility: on net, stochastic mortality causes consumers to shift consumption forward a bit less than deterministic mortality.

What happens when an individual transitions to a new health state? Because the consumer is not insured against mortality or quality of life risks, consumption will jump. The sign of the jump can be positive or negative, depending on the characteristics of the new health state relative to the old state. Because there is no consensus regarding the sign of health state dependence ($u_{eq}()$), let alone the magnitude, we hold quality of life constant for the time being, and return to this issue in our empirical analysis. Focusing on mortality, the model predicts that transitioning to a state where the current mortality and future expected mortality are high will shift consumption forward (see Figure 7), and vice versa. Our next result proves this formally for a two-state case.

**Proposition 5:**

Let there be $n = 2$ states with identical quality of life profiles, so that $q_1(s) = q_2(s) \forall s$. Assume that $\bar{\mu}_1(s) < \bar{\mu}_2(s) \forall s$, so that state 1 is “healthy” and state 2 is “sick.” Suppose that the consumer transitions from state 1 to state 2 at time $t$, with no accompanying decrease in income (i.e., $m_1(t) \leq m_2(t)$). Then $c_1(t) < c_2(t)$.

**Proof of Proposition 5:** see Appendix A

It follows immediately from Proposition 5 that the value of near-term life-years will increase, and the value of distant life-years will decrease, when transitioning from a healthy state with low mortality to a sick state with higher mortality. Whether VSL rises or falls is ambiguous, however. A rise in mortality risk lowers lifetime utility, which reduces VSL, but it also reduces the marginal utility of consumption, which increases VSL. Thus, the net effect depends on the curvature of the utility function relative to the curvature of the marginal utility function. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution, $\sigma$, is a common measure of the utility curvature. The analogous measure for the curvature of marginal utility is prudence (Kimball 1990). Define relative prudence as

---


12 The proof can be extended to allow for a larger number of states, but the conditions required to sign the jump in consumption then become a complicated function of the matrix of transition probabilities and state-specific mortality rates. The two-state case conveys the basic result without a meaningful loss of generality.
\[ \pi \equiv - \frac{c u_{ccc}(\cdot)}{u_{cc}(\cdot)} \]

Our next result provides a sufficient condition for VSL to rise following an adverse mortality shock.

**Proposition 6:**
Consider a two-state setting with assumptions set out in Proposition 5. Assume further that preferences satisfy the additional condition

\[ \pi < \frac{2}{\sigma} \]

Suppose that the consumer transitions from state 1 to state 2 at time \( t \), and that \( \lambda_{12}(\tau) = 0 \forall \tau > t \). Then \( VSL(1, t) < VSL(2, t) \).

**Proof of Proposition 6:** see Appendix A

The condition specified in Proposition 6 is satisfied by many common preferences, such as CRRA with \( \sigma < 1 \) (which we employ in our numerical exercises) and quadratic preferences. Consumers with inelastic demand, i.e., preferences with a low value for \( \sigma \), find it costly to reallocate consumption over time. They therefore have a high willingness-to-pay for life-extension and are more likely to exhibit a rise in VSL following an adverse mortality shock. Likewise, consumers with low levels of prudence have nearly-linear marginal utility that decreases rapidly with consumption. This generates a high willingness-to-pay for life-extension following a shock that increases consumption.

**III.A. The value of statistical illness**

Unlike the deterministic model, the stochastic model permits an investigation not only into the value of preventing death, but also into the value of preventing transitions to other health states. This requires only a slight modification to the analysis presented above, and will result in a more general concept we term the *value of statistical illness*. With a slight abuse of notation, let state \( N + 1 \) correspond to death, so that \( V(t, W(t), N + 1) = 0 \). Let \( \delta_{ij}(t) \), \( i, j \leq N \), be a perturbation on the transition intensity \( \lambda_{ij}(t) \) and \( \delta_{i,N+1}(t) \) be a perturbation on the mortality rate \( \mu_{i}(t) \), where \( \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^{N+1} \int_0^T \delta_{ij}(t) dt = 1 \), and consider

\[ \delta^\varepsilon(i, t) = \exp \left[ - \int_0^t (\mu_i(s) - \varepsilon \delta_{i,N+1}(s)) + \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^{N} (\lambda_{ij}(s) - \varepsilon \delta_{ij}(s)) ds \right], \text{where } \varepsilon > 0 \]

**Proposition 7:**
The marginal utility of preventing an illness or death is given by:

\[ \frac{\partial V}{\partial \varepsilon} \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} = \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \delta^\varepsilon(i, t) \left[ \int_0^t \sum_{j \neq i} \delta_{ij}(s) ds \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) \right. \]

\[ \left. - \sum_{j \neq i} \delta_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right] dt \]

**Proof of Proposition 7:**
From (13), the marginal utility of preventing an illness or death is:

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \varepsilon} \bigg|_{t=0} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \int_0^t e^{-\mu t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t (\bar{p}_i(s) - \varepsilon \delta_{ij}(s)) + \sum_{j=1}^n (\lambda_{ij}(s) - \varepsilon \delta_{ij}(s)) ds \right\} \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j=1}^n (\lambda_{ij}(t) - \varepsilon \delta_{ij}(t)) V(t, W(t), j) \right) dt \bigg|_{t=0}
\]

\[
= \int_0^T e^{-\mu t} \delta(i, t) \left[ \left( \int_0^t \delta_{ij}(s) ds \right) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) - \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right] dt
\]

\[
+ \int_0^T e^{-\mu t} \delta(i, t) \left( u_i \left( c_j(t), q_j(t) \right) \frac{\partial c_j(t)}{\partial \varepsilon} + \sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_{ij}(t) \frac{\partial V(t, W(t), j)}{\partial \varepsilon} \right) dt
\]

Following the same argument as in the VSL case, the second term in the last equality is equal to 0.

QED

The value of preventing an illness or death is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between the transition perturbation and wealth:

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \varepsilon} = \int_0^T e^{-\mu t} \delta(i, t) \left[ \left( \int_0^t \delta_{ij}(s) ds \right) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j=1}^n \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) - \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right] dt
\]

As before, it is helpful to choose the Dirac delta function for \( \delta(\cdot) \), so that the probability is perturbed at \( t = 0 \) and remains unaffected otherwise. It is also helpful to consider a reduction in the transition probability for only one alternative state, \( j_0 \), so that \( \delta_{ij}(t) = 0 \ \forall j \neq j_0 \). Applying these two conditions then yields what we term the value of statistical illness, \( VSI(i, j) \):

\[
VSI(i, j) = \frac{V(0, W(0), i) - V(0, W(0), j)}{u_c(c_i(0), q_i(0))}
\]

Equation (17) provides justification for the common practice of equating the values of prevention and treatment. Conventional cost-effectiveness analysis relies upon the standard fully annuitized framework.
that assumes the value of a life-year is equal across health states (holding quality of life constant). If the value of a life-year is constant, then equation (18) implies that prevention and treatment are equally valuable, as long as they add the same number of expected life-years. For example, conventional cost-effectiveness frameworks value a treatment that prevents the onset of an illness that lowers life expectancy by 10 years the same as a therapeutic treatment that cures an illness and adds 10 years of life expectancy (Drummond et al. 2005b).

In contrast, equation (17) shows that removing access to annuity markets breaks this equivalence between treatment and prevention. VSI in this case is not equal to the simple difference in VSL between the healthy and sick states, because VSL in the sick state is valued from the perspective of the sick, who have a lower marginal utility of consumption due to a shorter life span. This leads to the natural hypothesis that whenever VSL rises following an illness, the value of treatments (VSL per life-year) will be higher than equivalent preventive care prior to the illness (VSI per life-year). It is simple to show this for the case where the illness reduces life expectancy by one-half or more (proof available upon request). We conjecture that the hypothesis is true for any illness that reduces life expectancy.

To summarize, the stochastic mortality model yields the following implications:

- The values of near-term life-years rise, and distant life-years fall, when an individual transitions to a higher mortality state.
- The value of statistical life may rise or fall when an individual transitions to a higher mortality state; if the individual’s demand is sufficiently inelastic, or insufficiently prudent, then it will rise.
- Therapies that increase survival by treating sick patients are not the same as, and may even be more valuable than, those that add the same amount of life expectancy by preventing illness in healthy patients.

IV. ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF LIFE

This section measures the social value of gains to health and longevity and how that value interacts with annuitization. We start with a simple deterministic mortality model and then incorporate stochastic health shocks. We demonstrate how the value of statistical life depends on an individual’s health history, and that the willingness-to-pay for treatment exceeds the willingness-to-pay for prevention.

Our empirical framework, which incorporates survival and health status uncertainty into a life-cycle model, is related to a number of papers that study the savings behavior of the elderly (Kotlikoff 1988; Palumbo 1999; De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010). These prior studies allow health to affect wealth accumulation by including two or three different health states in the model. By contrast, our second empirical exercise allows mortality and quality of life to vary across 20 different health states.

IV.A. Framework

We employ the discrete time analogue of our model. There are $n$ health states. Denote the transition probabilities between health states by:

$$p_{ij}(t) = \mathbb{P}[Y_{t+1} = j | Y_t = i]$$

As in the continuous time model, the mortality rate at time $t, d(t)$, depends on the individual’s health state:

$$d(t) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \bar{d}^j(t) 1\{Y_t = j\}$$
where \( \{a^j(t)\} \) are given and \( 1\{Y_t = j\} \) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual is in state \( j \) at time \( t \) and 0 otherwise. The probability of surviving from time period \( t \) to time period \( s \) is denoted as \( S_t(s) \), where

\[
S_t(t) = 1,
\]

\[
S_t(s) = S_t(s - 1)(1 - d_{s-1}), s > t
\]

Let \( c(t), q(t), \) and \( W(t) \) denote consumption, quality of life, and wealth in period \( t \), respectively. Let \( \rho \) denote the utility discount rate, and \( r \) the interest rate. Assume that in each period the consumer receives an exogenously determined income, \( y(t) \), and that the maximum lifespan of a consumer is \( T \) (i.e., \( d(T) = 1 \)). Our baseline model assumes there is no bequest motive, although we relax this assumption in a later exercise.

The consumer’s maximization problem is

\[
\max_{\{c(t)\}} E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{T} e^{-\rho t} S_0(t) u(c(t), q(t)) \right]
\]

subject to

\[
W(0) \text{ given}, \quad W(t) \geq 0,
\]

\[
W(t + 1) = (W(t) + y(t) - c(t))e^r
\]

We assume throughout that \( r = \rho = 0.03 \) (Siegel 1992; Moore and Viscusi 1990). Finally, we assume that utility takes the following CRRA form:

\[
u(c,q) = q \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}
\] (19)

As discussed in Section III, there is no consensus regarding the sign or magnitude of health state dependence (\( u_{cq}(\cdot) \)). Here, we assume a multiplicative relationship where the marginal utility of consumption is higher when quality of life is high, and vice versa.

We have normalized the utility of death to zero in (19). The consumer receives positive utility if she consumes an amount greater than \( c \), which represents a subsistence level of consumption. Consuming an amount less than \( c \) generates utility that is worse than death. Although adding a constant to the utility function does not affect the solution to the consumer’s maximization problem, it matters when calculating the value of life.\(^\text{14}\) We are unaware of any empirical evidence on the magnitude of \( c \), the subsistence level of consumption in the United States. We assume it is equal to $5,000, which is in line with the parameterization employed in Murphy and Topel (2006).

\(^{14}\) Rosen (1988) was the first to point out that the level of utility is an important determinant of the value of life. See also additional discussion on this point in Hall and Jones (2007).
The parameter \( \gamma \) is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, an important determinant of both the value of life and the value of annuitization. We follow Hall and Jones (2007) and set \( \gamma = 2 \) in our analyses.

We employ dynamic programming techniques to solve for the optimal consumption path. The value function is defined as:

\[
V(t, w, i) = \max_{\{c(t)\}} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{s=t}^{T} e^{-\rho(s-t)}S_t(s)u(c(s), q(s)) \left| Y_t = i \right. \right]
\]

We then reformulate the optimization problem as a recursive Bellman equation:

\[
V(t, w, i) = \max_{\{c(t)\}} \left[ u(c(t)) + \frac{1 - d(t)}{e^\rho} \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{ij}(t)V(t + 1, (W(t) + y(t) - c(t))e^\gamma, j) \right]
\]

After solving for the optimal consumption path, we use the analytical formulas derived in the previous sections to calculate the value of life. Complete details are provided in Appendix C.

We are aware that there is significant uncertainty among economists regarding the proper values of many of the parameters in our model. The goal of the subsequent analyses is to illustrate the significance of our insights when our model is applied to real-world data using reasonable parameterizations. In some analyses, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative assumptions regarding the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, \( 1/\gamma \), and to the presence of a bequest motive. While the value of \( \gamma \) matters greatly for the value of life, it does not have any qualitative effect on our findings regarding the determinants of that value.

The remainder of this section reports results from two separate empirical exercises. The first illustrates the effect of different annuitization schemes on the aggregate value of life. We employ a deterministic (one-state) model because aggregate mortality data are not readily available by health state. The second exercise employs detailed microsimulation health data that are available for 20 different health states. There, we limit our focus to non-annuitized individuals, which allows us to calculate exact solutions to our empirical model.

**IV.B. Retirement policy and the value of life**

This section explores the link between retirement policy and the value of life. We build up to these results by calculating how the value of statistical life varies over the lifecycle under alternative annuitization policies. We then calculate how these alternative policies influence the value of permanent reductions in mortality. All our calculations account for the effect of mortality reduction on net savings, regardless of the degree of annuitization. This facilitates comparison across different annuitization scenarios and makes it appropriate to interpret our estimates as the social value of increased longevity. (See footnote 7.)

We initiate the model at age 20 and assume nobody survives past age 100. We obtain data on age-specific mortality rates from the Human Mortality Database. Because these mortality data are not available by health state, in this section we will assume deterministic mortality. (This corresponds to specifying \( n = 1 \) health states in the framework above.) For this particular exercise, we also abstract from the role of quality of life by setting \( q(t) = 1 \), because aggregate, nationally representative data on quality-of-life trends are not generally available. (Quality of life will be explicitly incorporated into the analysis presented in Section IV.C.) Finally, we choose the individual’s labor earnings, \( \{m(t)\} \), to fit data on
average life-cycle earnings as estimated by the Current Population Survey and the Health and Retirement Survey. See Appendix B1 for details.

The individual’s period income is equal to \( y(t) = (1 - \tau)m(t) + a(t) \), where \( a(t) \) is nonwage defined-benefit income financed by an earnings tax, \( \tau \). We consider three different policy scenarios in the main text. In the first, financial markets are absent and the consumer’s income corresponds to labor earnings: \( y^1(t) = m(t) \). Thus, her consumption is limited by current period income and savings from prior periods. The second scenario introduces an actuarially fair Social Security program that provides an annuity equal to \$16,195 beginning at age 65.\(^{15}\) In this second scenario, the consumer is partially annuitized, but she still lacks access to financial markets and cannot borrow against her future income. The third scenario increases the size of the Social Security pension by 50 percent. Finally, in the appendix we also present results for the case where the consumer fully annuitizes at age 20 and enjoys a constant annuity stream, \( \bar{y} = \bar{a} \), provided by an actuarially fair and complete annuities market. The income streams in all scenarios are related according to the following equation:

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{y^1(t)S(t)}{e^{r(t-1)}} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{y^2(t)S(t)}{e^{r(t-1)}} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{y^3(t)S(t)}{e^{r(t-1)}} = \bar{y} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{S(t)}{e^{r(t-1)}}
\]

Our assumed interest rate of 3 percent and our data on mortality and earnings imply a full annuity value of \( \bar{y} = \$37,897 \).

The life-cycle profiles of consumption for the first two policy scenarios are displayed in Figure 2. Consumption is constrained by the consumer’s low income in early life. She saves during middle age when income is high, and then consumes her savings during retirement until eventually her consumption equals her pension (if available). Consumption for an individual with no annuity is “shifted forward” relative to an individual with a Social Security pension. This effect is particularly dramatic in the final 10 years of life, when old consumers outlive their wealth. This is not surprising: a primary benefit of an annuity is its ability to provide income to consumers in their oldest ages.

Figure 3 shows that this difference in consumption generates a corresponding difference in the value of a life-year. Individuals place a low value on life-years at very young and very old ages, because consumption is low. The slight drop at age 65 reflects the effect of retirement on the net savings component of the value of life.

Figure 4 displays the corresponding value of statistical life (VSL) for these two scenarios, as calculated by equation (7). At age 40, VSL is equal to \$7 million for an individual with no annuity, and \$8 million for an individual who will be eligible for Social Security at age 65. Both these values are within the ranges estimated by empirical studies of VSL for working-age individuals (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Figure 4 also shows that VSL is greater at older ages for a person with a Social Security pension than it is for a person with no annuity. This suggests that public annuity programs are complementary with retiree healthcare programs and other investments in life-extension for the elderly population.

Finally, we calculate the value of historical reductions in mortality for these different annuitization scenarios, as well as the prospective value of permanent reductions in future mortality for selected diseases. Let \( \delta \) denote a vector of mortality reductions for different ages. As in Murphy and Topel (2006),

\(^{15}\) This corresponds to the average retirement benefit paid by Social Security to retired workers in 2016 (www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/2016-07.pdf).
we calculate the total social value of a mortality reduction by aggregating over the age distribution of the 2015 US population:

$$\text{Social Value} = \sum_{a=0}^{110} VLE(a, \delta)f(a)$$

where $VLE(a, \delta)$ is defined as in equation (5), and $f(a)$ is the count of individuals alive in 2015 at age $a$.\(^{16}\)

We report our results in Table 1. Life expectancy at birth increased by over 10 years between 1940 and 2010. Like Murphy and Topel (2006), we find that the social value of these past longevity gains are substantial: the post-1940 gains are worth over $100 trillion today, and the post-1970 gains are worth over $50 trillion. Comparing results for different annuitization scenarios informs our understanding of the interaction between retirement policies and the value of longevity. For example, consider the introduction of Social Security over the last century. Comparing Column (1) to Column (2) of Table 1 suggests that this increased the value of post-1940 longevity gains by $11.5 trillion (10.5 percent), and increased the value of post-1970 gains by $6.2 trillion (11.6 percent). One way to interpret these values is to compare them to the longevity insurance value of Social Security, which is approximately $17 trillion.\(^{17}\) Thus, the interaction between post-1940 longevity gains and Social Security is worth about half as much as the longevity insurance value of the entire Social Security program itself.

Table 1 also reveals that Social Security has raised the value of a 10 percent cancer mortality reduction by $427 billion, or 13 percent. Alternatively, it has raised the value of a 10 percent reduction in all-cause mortality by $1.38 trillion (12 percent). Column (3) reports that increasing the size of Social Security pensions by 50 percent would add $723 billion more to that value.

A bequest motive encourages individuals to delay consumption, because money saved for consumption in old age also has the added benefit of increasing bequests in the event of death. Its effects on consumption and the value of longevity are therefore similar to that of increased annuitization. Since bequests are much more common among the wealthiest consumers (Hurd and Smith 2002), they are unlikely to matter much for our main estimates, which pertain to the median individual. However, for illustrative purposes we have also estimated our main specification under the assumption of a strong bequest motive that significantly affects savings behavior even for the median individual.\(^{18}\) Those results, illustrated in Figure 5, demonstrate that a bequest motive lowers the value of statistical life prior to age 65, and increases it at older ages. Intuitively, bequest motives increase the value of saving at younger ages. Appendix Table 7 further shows that in this case, the effect of Social Security on the value of post-1940 longevity gains is $5.5 trillion (5.1 percent), or about half as large as in a setting with no bequest motive. This suggests that the effect of retirement policy on the value of life matters most for non-wealthy individuals, whom are less likely to have a significant bequest motive.

\(^{16}\) Specifically, $VLE(a, \delta) = \int_a^{100} e^{-r(t-a)} \left[ \int_a^t \delta(s)ds \right] \nu(t)dt$. We assume $VLE(a, \delta) = VLE(20, \delta)$ for $a < 20$, and equal to $VLE(100, \delta)$ for $a > 100$. Unlike Murphy and Topel (2006), our social value calculation does not account for the value that mortality reductions generate for future (unborn) populations.

\(^{17}\) This value is calculated using the methodology of Mitchell et al. (1999) and does not account for other potential benefits of Social Security such as protection against inflation risk. See Appendix C1 for details.

\(^{18}\) When accounting for a bequest motive in this exercise, we follow Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) and assume the utility from leaving a bequest is linear in wealth. See Appendix C1 for details.
To summarize, our model predicts that annuitization raises the value of life for the elderly. This should cause them to spend more on healthcare and invest more in healthy behaviors, which in turn should ultimately manifest in increased life expectancy. This dovetails with the point, made by Philipson and Becker (1998), that the moral hazard effects of retirement programs also increase the willingness to pay for longevity. Philipson and Becker (1998) analyze data from Virga (1996) and find that people with more generous annuities live longer than those with less generous annuities. They interpret this as the effect of endogenous longevity investments, which are encouraged among highly annuitized individuals who do not bear the full cost of an increase in their longevity. In our model, by contrast, annuitization increases the value of life even when annuities are actuarially fair, because they protect against the risk of outliving one’s wealth. Given that these effects reinforce each other, it is not surprising that increases in the generosity of public pensions in developed countries have been accompanied by large increases in public spending on retiree healthcare.

IV.C. Stochastic health shocks and the value of life

Conventional economic theory conceives of VSL as depending primarily on age and income. Our general framework with stochastic mortality and incomplete annuitization implies instead a substantial amount of variability in VSL within these categories. For example, individuals who have experienced a recent negative mortality shock have systematically higher VSL, although this VSL premium decays over time. We use real-world data on mortality and quality of life to estimate the degree to which VSL varies within the traditional categories of age and income, and describe the factors explaining the variation. Later exercises also incorporate data on medical spending and allow for a bequest motive. We focus here on the private value of statistical life\(^{19}\) and abstract from potential externalities, e.g., investments in disease-prevention that might benefit public health insurance programs or other members of society.

Our data are provided by the Future Elderly Model (FEM), a widely published microsimulation model that employs comprehensive, nationally representative data from a wide array of sources (Michaud et al. 2011; Goldman et al. 2005; Lakdawalla, Goldman, and Shang 2005; Goldman et al. 2009; Lakdawalla et al. 2009; Goldman et al. 2013; Michaud et al. 2012; Goldman et al. 2010). The model produces estimates of mortality, disease incidence, quality of life, and medical spending at the individual level for people over the age of 50 with different comorbid conditions.\(^{20}\) The FEM accounts for six different chronic conditions (cancer, diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, chronic lung disease, and stroke) and six different impaired activities of daily living (bathing, eating, dressing, walking, getting in or out of bed, and using the toilet). The FEM provides us with a widely published and well-validated tool that combines information from multiple nationally representative data sources, including the Health and Retirement Study, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and the National Health Interview Survey. This provides a number of advantages for our study. For instance, while the HRS possesses a uniquely rich set of covariates on health and wealth, it lacks survey questions that would allow us to calculate quality of life using validated survey instruments. To solve this problem,

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\(^{19}\) That is, our calculations in this section do not account for net savings, which will generally be negative for the elderly population we focus on here because expected future consumption is larger than future income. This omission increases the value of treatment relative to prevention: prevention is consumed by the healthy, who live longer than the sick and thus have larger expected future consumption, i.e., their (negative) net savings are larger in magnitude.

\(^{20}\) Additional details about the FEM’s methodology are provided in Appendix B2. A complete technical description is available at roybalhealthpolicy.usc.edu/fem/technical-specifications/.
the FEM weaves together validated quality of life estimates from the MEPS and maps them to the HRS using variables common to both databases.

We divide the health space within the FEM into \( n = 20 \) states. Each state corresponds to the number (0, 1, 2, 3 or more) of impaired activities of daily living (ADL) and the number (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or more) of chronic conditions, for a total of \( 4 \times 5 = 20 \) health states. Health states are ordered first by number of ADL’s and then by number of chronic diseases, so that state 1 corresponds to 0 ADL’s and 0 chronic conditions, state 2 corresponds to 0 ADL’s and 1 chronic condition, and so on. For each health state and age, the FEM estimates the probability of dying and the probability of transitioning to each of the other health states in the next year. As in the theoretical model, individuals can transition only to higher-numbered states, i.e., \( p_{ij}(t) = 0 \forall j < i \). In other words, all ADL’s and chronic conditions are permanent. The FEM also estimates quality of life for each health state and age, as measured by the EuroQol five dimensions questionnaire (EQ-5D). These five dimensions are based on five survey questions that elicit the extent of a respondent’s problems with mobility, self-care, daily activities, pain, and anxiety/depression. These questions are then weighted using stated preference data to compute the relative importance of each. The result is a single quality of life measure, the EQ-5D, typically reported on a scale from zero to one.

Table 2 presents basic descriptive statistics for the data provided by the FEM model. Life expectancy at age 50 ranges from 30.4 years for a healthy individual in state 1 to 8.6 years for an ill individual in state 20. Quality of life, as measured by the EQ-5D index, ranges from 0.54 to 0.88 at age 50. Columns (7) and (8) of Table 2 report the annual probability that an individual exits her health state but remains alive, i.e., acquires at least one new ADL or chronic condition. Health states are relatively persistent, with exit rates never exceeding 15 percent. State 20 is an absorbing state with an exit rate of 0 percent.

We focus here on a setting where individuals do not have access to annuity markets, and we make two simplifying assumptions that allow us to calculate exact, analytical solutions to the consumer’s problem: we assume an individual can borrow against her future income, and that income is not survival contingent. These two assumptions imply an equivalence between income and wealth, allowing us to ignore income and to work with wealth only. See Appendix C2 for the derivation. We set initial wealth equal to $807,604, which corresponds to the net present value of all wealth and future earnings at age 50 as estimated by the deterministic model presented in the prior section. All other parameterizations are the same as before.

If an individual never suffers a health shock, then her consumption and VSL will decline smoothly with age. However, the arrival of a health shock can increase VSL, sometimes substantially. Figure 6 displays consumption and VSL for an initially healthy individual who develops one ADL (health state 6) at age 60, and then two more ADLs plus two chronic conditions (health state 18) at age 70. The first shock reduces her life expectancy by 3.0 years and her quality of life by 0.06. The second one reduces her life expectancy by 0.1 years and her quality of life by 0.02.

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21 The five dimensions of the EQ-5D are weighted using estimates from Shaw, Johnson, and Coons (2005). The specific process for estimating the quality of life score is explained in the FEM technical documentation, which can be found in the supplemental information appendix of Agus et al. (2016).

22 Generalizing the model to allow for partial annuitization is possible but prohibits the calculation of an exact solution. The effect of annuitization on the value of life is illustrated instead by the deterministic mortality model presented in the previous section. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) show that failing to include a “welfare floor” in the budget constraint causes life-cycle models to overestimate savings for low-income households. Our exercises model median-income individuals, however, for whom this issue is less important.
expectancy by 6.7 years and her quality of life by 0.20. In contrast to a healthy consumer, the sick consumer’s consumption exhibits discontinuous jumps at ages 60 and 70 as a result of these two negative health shocks. The first shock has a mild effect on the declining trend in VSL, but the second increases her VSL at age 70 by nearly 50 percent, from $2.9 million to $4.3 million. This jump is driven by the reduction in life expectancy and would remain large even if quality of life were held constant.

Individual-level shocks generate substantial variability in VSL in the aggregate. Figure 7 reports results from a Monte Carlo simulation of 10,000 life-cycle modeling exercises. At age 50, all individuals are identical and have a VSL of $5.9 million. As they age, some begin to suffer health shocks that, at least initially, increase their VSL. By age 60, the VSL inter-vigintile range spans $4.2 to $5.3 million. This dispersion is compressed towards the end of life, when mortality reaches 100 percent.

The presence of multiple health states also allows us to calculate the value of a statistical illness (VSI). Column (3) of Table 3 reports VSI at age 50 from the perspective of a healthy individual. Each value represents the healthy individual’s willingness to pay for a marginal, contemporaneous reduction in the probability of developing an illness corresponding to one of the 19 other health states. The values are inversely related to life expectancy in the sick state because it is more valuable to prevent the onset of a lethal disease than a mild one. The highest VSI is $3.5 million, which corresponds to preventing the onset of a sick state with 3 ADL’s and 4 chronic conditions (health state 20). The interpretation of this value is analogous to VSL: it is the amount that 1,000 healthy individuals would collectively be willing to pay in order to reduce their risk of developing this illness by 1/1000. In our framework, VSL can be interpreted as the willingness to pay to avoid the “illness” of dying, which correspond to a state with 0 years of remaining life expectancy.

How does the value of prevention compare to the value of treatment? We investigate this question by normalizing VSL and VSI by the number of life-years saved. In contrast to the standard framework, here the value of a life-year may vary depending on whether life-years were saved by preventing an illness or treating it. Intuitively, health interventions are worth more after health shocks than before them, because those shocks accelerate consumption and increase the value of life.

Table 3 illustrates this point with data. According to our VSL calculations, for example, a 50-year-old with one chronic condition and no ADL’s (health state 2) has a marginal willingness-to-pay of $228,000 per life-year for a treatment that extends her life. However, the VSI calculation reveals that a healthy individual (health state 1) is only willing to pay $115,000 per life-year saved through preventing the onset health state 2. In this case, treatment is twice as valuable as prevention. Column (6) of Table 2 shows that the value of life-years saved by treating illness always exceeds the value gained by prevention – by as much as a factor of 10, for the sickest state in our model.

Figure 8 displays these results graphically. It depicts how VSL and VSI vary across our health states, which are arrayed along the x-axis from longest to shortest life expectancy. The solid blue bars depict VSL per life-year and demonstrate that the value gained through treatment is monotonically higher for states with lower remaining life expectancy. The dotted red bars show the value per life-year gained by preventing each health state, from the perspective of a perfectly healthy person. For instance, the left-most dotted red bar reports the value of each life-year saved when a perfectly healthy consumer reduces the risk of entering the health state with 27.7 years of life expectancy. Notice that VSI is relatively stable across health states. This makes sense, because VSI is calculated from the fixed perspective of a perfectly healthy person; therefore, consumption profiles and the marginal utility of consumption remain stable. The minor variation in VSI per life-year is due primarily to differences in current and expected future quality of life across states.
Our results might help account for low private willingness to invest in prevention (Dranove 1998). Even holding health gains fixed, individuals might have weaker incentives to invest in prevention. This wedge in the value of preventive versus treating technology thus magnifies any external benefits of prevention that further separate the private and social willingness to pay for prevention.

In the years following the diagnosis, however, the gap between the value of treatment and prevention narrows. Figure 9 compares the value of treatment for the consumer who suffered the second health shock depicted in Figure 6 to the value of prevention for a consumer who never suffered that second health shock. The value of treatment exceeds the value of prevention, but only for the first 10 years following the shock. After that point, the sick patient has spent down much of her wealth, which causes a significant reduction in her VSL, although we note that most patients will have died before reaching this point. (Life expectancy at age 70 for patients in health state 18 is 8.1 years.) This result also demonstrates that first-line therapies are more valuable than second-line therapies.

We pause to note that the difference in the private value of prevention versus treatment hinges on the distinction between ex ante and ex post valuations. Prevention is necessarily an ex ante concept, but treatments can be valued ex ante or ex post. From an ex ante point of view, the difference between equally effective preventive care and treatment is trivial—it does not matter much whether an individual avoids a disease by getting vaccinated when healthy or by paying an insurance premium that provides access to a drug that instantly cures her when ill. Put differently, there is little meaningful difference between prevention and treatment in the long run.

But as Keynes dryly noted, “in the long run, we are all dead.” In the short run, society includes adults who suffer from diseases that lack effective treatment and therefore value new medical innovations from an ex post perspective. Medical research policy decisions made on behalf of society should account for the value they generate for both healthy and sick individuals.

Our final set of exercises incorporates medical spending data from the FEM into our framework. Appendix Figure 11 reports average out-of-pocket medical spending for selected health states, by age. These data are comprehensive and include all inpatient, outpatient, prescription drug, and long-term care spending that is not paid for by insurance. Spending is higher in sicker health states, and—consistent with De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010)—increases greatly at older ages, when long-term care expenses arise.

Incorporating these spending data directly into our model would require resorting to numerical solutions. Instead, we reformulate these data as wealth shocks, which should yield qualitatively similar results while still allowing us to calculate an exact solution to the consumer’s problem. Specifically, we modify the law of motion for wealth so that the effective interest rate depends on the health state:

$$ W(\tau + 1) = \left( W(\tau) - c(\tau) \right) e^{r(t,Y_\tau)} $$

where $r(t,Y_\tau) = 0.03 + \ln[1 - s(t,Y_\tau)]$ and $s(t,Y_\tau)$ is the share of an individual’s wealth spent on medical and nursing home care in health state $Y_\tau$ and time $t$. Appendix C2 provides full details.

Figure 10 illustrates that incorporating medical spending reduces VSL slightly, but does not otherwise appreciably alter its life-cycle profile, even in the presence of significant health shocks. This remains true

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23 Specifically, we divide out-of-pocket medical spending in health state $Y_\tau$ at time $t$ by $W(t)$, where $W(t)$ was estimated by our model for a healthy individual in a setting with no medical spending. Our results are similar if we instead use wealth estimates from the Health and Retirement Study.
even if we employ total, rather than out-of-pocket, medical spending. The reason is that the difference in medical spending between healthy and sick individuals is small relative to the variation in spending by age (see Appendix Figure 11). A sufficiently large idiosyncratic spending shock will have a significant impact, however. This is illustrated by the dotted black line in Figure 10, which plots VSL for a hypothetical case where the individual’s wealth falls by 30 percent following the health shock at age 70, rather than the much smaller medical spending amount estimated by the FEM. Although VSL still increases at age 70, the rise is far smaller than in the other two cases. Thus, while accounting for typical medical spending does not alter our basic results, catastrophic expenditures can matter.

Our last exercise values the longevity gains experienced over the past 15 years. During this period, all-cause mortality for the US population ages 50 and over has fallen by 18%, with cancer and heart disease mortality both falling by 21%. Panel A of Table 4 values these health gains from the perspective of a current 50-year-old. In a setting with no out-of-pocket medical spending, the private value of the reduction in all-cause mortality is worth $95,000 to $302,000, depending on the assumed value of relative risk version. The values are reduced slightly if we include out-of-pocket medical spending. Panel B shows that these estimates are reduced by 10 to 20 percent if we incorporate a bequest motive into the model.

V. CONCLUSION

The economic theory surrounding the value of life has found many important applications. Yet, like most theories, it suffers from several anomalies that appear at odds with intuition or empirical facts – e.g., the apparent preferences of consumers to pay more for life-extension when survival prospects are bleaker. We have demonstrated that several of these anomalies can be reconciled without abandoning the standard framework, simply by relaxing its strong (and likely false) assumptions around the completeness of annuity markets and deterministic mortality. Moreover, relaxing these assumptions generates new predictions with implications for health policy and behavior. We show that VSL varies with the arrival of mortality shocks, and that a given gain in longevity can be more valuable to a consumer who has less life remaining, and vice-versa. Even holding wealth and income fixed, VSL may vary by $1 million or more for a 50-year-old. In addition, we demonstrate an interaction between annuity policy and health policy: Completing the annuity market may significantly increase the value of life, especially for the elderly. For instance, the US Social Security program has increased the value of mortality reductions, adding nearly $150 billion to the value of a 1 percent mortality decline.

Our findings have several implications for the valuation of health investments and for policy more generally. The value of a life-year will tend to vary across types of risk, not just across types of people. It can be more valuable to add one month of life for a patient facing a highly fatal disease than for one facing a much milder ailment. Thus, health spending should be more targeted towards the severely ill than current economic models of cost-effectiveness suggest.

In addition, public programs that expand the market for annuities might simultaneously boost the demand for life-extending technologies. Intuitively, annuities calm consumer fears about outliving their wealth and thus enable more aggressive investments in life-extension. Viewed differently, our results also show that market failures in annuities affect the value of statistical life, and thus the socially optimal level of health care spending. Our results suggest that researchers and policymakers should pay more attention to the public finance interactions between pension and healthcare systems.

24 Source: authors’ calculations using mortality data from the National Vital Statistics.
Finally, our framework offers a single unified framework for valuing both life-extension and the prevention of illness. This provides a more practical tool for policymakers and decision makers, since many health investments involve preventing the deterioration of health, not a direct and immediate mortality risk. Our result also provides one explanation for why it has proven to be so difficult for policymakers and public health advocates to encourage investments in the prevention of disease. From the private perspective, prevention is often less valuable than treatment, even though there may be public goods – e.g., savings in public health insurance programs – associated with prevention investments. Kremer and Snyder (2015) show that heterogeneity in consumer values distorts R&D incentives by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus from treatments than with preventives. Our results suggest that differences in private VSL may reinforce this result and further disadvantage incentives to develop preventives.

Our analysis raises a number of important questions for further research. First, how does the value of longevity vary with endogenous demand for quality of life? Elsewhere, we have studied how incomplete health insurance enhances the value of medical technology that improves quality of life, because such technology acts as insurance by compressing the difference in utility between the sick and healthy states (Lakdawalla, Malani, and Reif 2017). Less clear is how demands for the quantity and quality of life interact with financial market incompleteness of various kinds. Second, what does the generalized value of life model mean for the value of different kinds of medical technologies? For instance, the model suggests that short-term survival gains for high-risk diseases are more valuable than previously believed, but very long-term survival gains might actually be less valuable than previously believed. Finally, what are the implications for the empirical literature on VSL? Empirical analysis has typically proceeded under the assumption that different kinds of mortality risk are all valued the same way, as long as they imply similar changes in the probability of dying (Viscusi and Aldy 2003; Hirth et al. 2000; Mrozek and Taylor 2002). Our framework casts doubt on this assumption and suggests the need for a more nuanced empirical approach. This missing insight may be one reason for the widely disparate empirical estimates of the value of a statistical life.
VI. REFERENCES


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### VII. TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Aggregate social value of historical and prospective reductions in mortality (billions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Historical reduction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1940-2010</td>
<td>$109,356</td>
<td>$120,855</td>
<td>$126,488</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970-2010</td>
<td>$53,492</td>
<td>$59,673</td>
<td>$62,769</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B. 10% reduction, all ages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All causes</td>
<td>$11,550</td>
<td>$12,928</td>
<td>$13,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>$3,348</td>
<td>$3,775</td>
<td>$3,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetes</td>
<td>$368</td>
<td>$414</td>
<td>$437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart disease</td>
<td>$2,425</td>
<td>$2,744</td>
<td>$2,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>$105</td>
<td>$102</td>
<td>$99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious diseases</td>
<td>$166</td>
<td>$188</td>
<td>$201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: These aggregate values were calculated using the 2015 US population by age. Column (1) presents estimates under the assumption that individuals have no annuities in retirement. Column (2) presents estimates under the assumption that individuals receive typical Social Security benefits that are financed by an earnings tax. Column (3) increases the generosity of Social Security by 50%, financed by an increase in the earnings tax. The net present value of individuals’ wealth at age 20 is the same across all three columns.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health state</th>
<th>ADL’s</th>
<th>Chronic conditions</th>
<th>Life expectancy</th>
<th>Quality of life</th>
<th>Exit probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3) Age 50</td>
<td>(4) Age 70</td>
<td>(5) Age 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (healthy)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>0.850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.812</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4+</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>0.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4+</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4+</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>4+</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the microsimulation data generated by the Future Elderly Model (FEM) for ages 50 and 70. Columns (1) and (2) report the number of impaired activities of daily living (ADL) and the number of chronic conditions, which together define each health state. Column (3)-(6) report life expectancy and quality of life for an individual in one of these health states. Quality of life is measured using the EQ-5D index, which ranges from 0 (death) to 1 (perfectly healthy). Columns (7) and (8) report the probability that an individual transitions to a different health state in the following year. All ADL’s and chronic conditions are permanent, so individuals can only transition to higher-numbered health states. See Appendix B2 for additional documentation of the FEM.
Table 3. Value of treatment and prevention (in thousands of dollars) at age 50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health state</th>
<th>Life expectancy</th>
<th>VSL</th>
<th>VSI</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Prevention</th>
<th>Treatment/Prevention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (healthy)</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>$5,878</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$193</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>$6,302</td>
<td>$312</td>
<td>$228</td>
<td>$115</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>$6,786</td>
<td>$483</td>
<td>$260</td>
<td>$113</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>$6,930</td>
<td>$774</td>
<td>$288</td>
<td>$123</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>$7,421</td>
<td>$783</td>
<td>$312</td>
<td>$119</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>$7,321</td>
<td>$833</td>
<td>$312</td>
<td>$121</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>$8,021</td>
<td>$1,163</td>
<td>$375</td>
<td>$129</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>$8,089</td>
<td>$1,200</td>
<td>$386</td>
<td>$127</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>$7,780</td>
<td>$1,366</td>
<td>$388</td>
<td>$132</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>$8,151</td>
<td>$1,354</td>
<td>$408</td>
<td>$130</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>$8,782</td>
<td>$1,621</td>
<td>$476</td>
<td>$136</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>$9,057</td>
<td>$1,721</td>
<td>$514</td>
<td>$135</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>$9,248</td>
<td>$1,941</td>
<td>$566</td>
<td>$138</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>$8,966</td>
<td>$2,102</td>
<td>$575</td>
<td>$142</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>$9,949</td>
<td>$2,165</td>
<td>$655</td>
<td>$142</td>
<td>4.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>$10,308</td>
<td>$2,258</td>
<td>$712</td>
<td>$142</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>$10,771</td>
<td>$2,595</td>
<td>$846</td>
<td>$147</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>$11,468</td>
<td>$2,721</td>
<td>$943</td>
<td>$149</td>
<td>6.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>$12,081</td>
<td>$2,944</td>
<td>$1,102</td>
<td>$152</td>
<td>7.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>$13,988</td>
<td>$3,453</td>
<td>$1,621</td>
<td>$159</td>
<td>10.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table displays values (in thousands of dollars) from a life-cycle modeling exercise where health is stochastic. Values are sorted by life expectancy at age 50, as reported in column (1). Column (2) reports the value of statistical life (VSL) for a 50-year-old in each health state. Column (3) reports the values of statistical illness (VSI) for a healthy individual in state 1, i.e., that individual’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) to prevent a marginal increase in the probability of transitioning to one of the other 19 health states. Column (4) reports a sick individual’s WTP per life-year for a therapeutic treatment, which is equal to the value in column (2) divided by the value in column (1). Column (5) reports the healthy individual’s corresponding WTP for preventive care, which is equal to the value in column (3) divided by the difference between 30.4 (life expectancy when healthy) and the value in column (1). Column (6) reports the ratio of the values reported in columns (4) and (5). The twenty health states are defined in Table 2.
Table 4. Per capita value of historical 2001-2015 health gains, at age 50 (thousands of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Increase in life expectancy at age 50 (years)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. No bequest motive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All causes</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>$95</td>
<td>$159</td>
<td>$302</td>
<td>$87</td>
<td>$142</td>
<td>$263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>$23</td>
<td>$40</td>
<td>$77</td>
<td>$21</td>
<td>$34</td>
<td>$65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart disease</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>$68</td>
<td>$116</td>
<td>$224</td>
<td>$59</td>
<td>$96</td>
<td>$185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Bequest motive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All causes</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>$87</td>
<td>$143</td>
<td>$275</td>
<td>$75</td>
<td>$121</td>
<td>$225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>$22</td>
<td>$36</td>
<td>$70</td>
<td>$18</td>
<td>$29</td>
<td>$55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart disease</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>$66</td>
<td>$106</td>
<td>$204</td>
<td>$52</td>
<td>$78</td>
<td>$150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative risk aversion</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical spending</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the value of the reduction in mortality experienced in the United States between 2001 and 2015, from the perspective of a current 50-year-old. The cancer and heart disease calculations do not account for competing risks, and thus should be interpreted as holding mortality from all other causes constant. Columns (1)-(3) report results under the assumption that the individual has no out-of-pocket healthcare costs. The values in Panel A are calculated under the assumption that individuals do not have a bequest motive, while those in Panel B assume the bequest motive specification described in Appendix C2.
Figure 1. Illustrative example: annual consumption for fully annuitized and non-annuitized consumers

Notes: This figure illustrates the well-known result that it is optimal for a non-annuitized consumer who is exposed to longevity risk to shift her consumption forward in time, relative to a fully annuitized consumer. For simplicity, this example assumes that the consumption profile of the fully annuitized consumer is flat.
Figure 2. Life-cycle profiles of consumption and income when mortality is deterministic

Notes: This figure plots consumption results from a life-cycle modeling exercise where mortality is deterministic. “Consumption (no annuity)” displays consumption for a consumer whose income equals her earnings. “Consumption (Social Security)” displays consumption for a consumer receiving typical Social Security benefits that are financed by an earnings tax. The net present value at age 20 of all future income is the same across both scenarios.
Figure 3. Life-cycle profile of the value of a life-year when mortality is deterministic

Notes: This figure plots the value of a life-year for the two scenarios displayed in Figure 2. “No annuity” assumes the consumer’s income equals her earnings. “Social Security” assumes the consumer receives typical Social Security benefits that are financed by an earnings tax. The net present value at age 20 of all future income is identical in both scenarios.
Figure 4. Life-cycle profile of the value of statistical life when mortality is deterministic

Notes: This figure plots the value of statistical life for the two scenarios displayed in Figure 2. “No annuity” assumes the consumer’s income equals her labor earnings. “Social Security” assumes the consumer receives typical Social Security benefits that are financed by an earnings tax. The net present value at age 20 of all future income is identical in both scenarios.
Figure 5. Similar to annuitization, a bequest motive shifts the value of statistical life towards older ages

Notes: This figure plots the value of statistical life in a setting with deterministic mortality and no annuity markets. The “No bequest motive” scenario is identical to the “No annuity” scenario depicted in Figure 4. The bequest motive specification is described at the end of Appendix C1.
Figure 6. Consumption and the value of statistical life can increase when an individual falls ill

Notes: This figure plots an individual’s consumption profile (left axis) and corresponding value of statistical life (right axis) as calculated from a life-cycle modeling exercise where mortality and quality of life are stochastic. This consumer is healthy at age 50, but then falls ill twice, once at age 60 and then again at age 70. At age 60, the illness causes permanent difficulties with one routine activity of daily living (ADL). At age 70, she is diagnosed with two chronic conditions and subsequently has difficulties with two additional ADL’s.
Figure 7. The value of statistical life depends on an individual’s health history

Notes: The figure reports the mean, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile of the value of statistical life (VSL) from a Monte Carlo simulation that is repeated 10,000 times. Each individual began the simulation at age 50 in the same healthy state. Stochastic health shocks generate differences in VSL at older ages.
Figure 8. Treatments for an ill patient are worth more than preventive care for a healthy individual

Notes: The blue solid bars report the value of statistical life (VSL) for an individual in one of 19 different sick states, divided by life expectancy in that state. The red dotted bars report the value of statistical illness (VSI) for a healthy individual (life expectancy: 30.4 years) divided by the reduction in life expectancy she would experience if she fell ill. The data plotted in this figure are also reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.
Figure 9. The value of treatment relative to prevention declines with time since illness

Notes: The blue solid bars report the value of statistical life (VSL) divided by life expectancy for the individual who suffered a health shock at age 70 (see Figure 6). The red dotted bars report the value of statistical illness (VSI) for a healthy individual divided by the reduction in life expectancy she would experience if she fell ill with the same disease.
Figure 10. Correlated spending shocks can attenuate the rise in the value of statistical life following a health shock

Notes: The solid red line reproduces the value of statistical life (VSL) estimates displayed in Figure 6. The dashed blue line incorporates out-of-pocket medical spending shocks into the life-cycle model. The dotted black line additionally incorporates a wealth shock at age 70 that reduces the individual’s wealth by 30 percent.
APPENDIX (FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY)

Appendix Table 5, Appendix Table 6, and Appendix Table 7 replicate Table 1 from the main text under different assumptions regarding the risk aversion parameter, γ, and the presence of a bequest motive. The value of life depends greatly on the assumed value of risk aversion. In the main text, we reported that Social Security raised the aggregate social value of post-1940 reductions by 10.5 percent. Varying the risk aversion parameter yields values that range from 8.3 percent to 14.2 percent. Including a strong bequest motive causes the increase to fall to 5.4 percent.

Appendix A provides proofs for lemmas and propositions stated in the main text. Appendix B provides supporting details for the data employed in the numerical models presented in Section IV, and Appendix C presents derivations for those models. Finally, Appendix D provides derivations for the value of statistical life and the value of statistical illness for a fully annuitized consumer when mortality is stochastic.

Appendix Tables and Figures

Appendix Table 5. Aggregate social value of historical and prospective reductions in mortality (billions of dollars) when the risk aversion parameter is set equal to γ = 2.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical reduction:</th>
<th>(1) No annuity</th>
<th>(2) Social Security</th>
<th>(3) Social Security + 50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-2010</td>
<td>$222,046</td>
<td>$253,546</td>
<td>$269,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-2010</td>
<td>$109,580</td>
<td>$126,291</td>
<td>$135,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% reduction, all ages:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All causes</td>
<td>$23,879</td>
<td>$27,569</td>
<td>$29,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>$6,943</td>
<td>$8,081</td>
<td>$8,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetes</td>
<td>$762</td>
<td>$885</td>
<td>$951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart disease</td>
<td>$5,068</td>
<td>$5,910</td>
<td>$6,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>$189</td>
<td>$187</td>
<td>$184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious diseases</td>
<td>$349</td>
<td>$408</td>
<td>$441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: These aggregate values were calculated using the 2015 US population by age. Column (1) presents estimates under the assumption that individuals have no annuities in retirement. Column (2) presents estimates under the assumption that individuals receive typical Social Security benefits that are financed by an earnings tax. Column (3) increases the generosity of Social Security by 50%, financed by an increase in the earnings tax. The net present value of individuals’ wealth at age 20 is the same across all three columns.
Appendix Table 6. Aggregate social value of historical and prospective reductions in mortality (billions of dollars) when the risk aversion parameter is set equal to $\gamma = 1.5$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No annuity</td>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>Social Security + 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical reduction:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-2010</td>
<td>$27,121</td>
<td>$29,381</td>
<td>$30,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-2010</td>
<td>$5,750</td>
<td>$6,277</td>
<td>$6,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% reduction, all ages:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All causes</td>
<td>$1,661</td>
<td>$1,822</td>
<td>$1,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>$183</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>$209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetes</td>
<td>$1,185</td>
<td>$1,310</td>
<td>$1,379</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heart disease</td>
<td>$63</td>
<td>$61</td>
<td>$59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>$80</td>
<td>$89</td>
<td>$94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious diseases</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: These aggregate values were calculated using the 2015 US population by age. Column (1) presents estimates under the assumption that individuals have no annuities in retirement. Column (2) presents estimates under the assumption that individuals receive typical Social Security benefits that are financed by an earnings tax. Column (3) increases the generosity of Social Security by 50%, financed by an increase in the earnings tax. The net present value of individuals’ wealth at age 20 is the same across all three columns.

Appendix Table 7. Aggregate social value of historical and prospective reductions in mortality (billions of dollars) when a bequest motive is present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No annuity</td>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>Social Security + 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical reduction:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-2010</td>
<td>$102,744</td>
<td>$108,261</td>
<td>$106,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-2010</td>
<td>$50,110</td>
<td>$53,081</td>
<td>$52,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% reduction, all ages:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All causes</td>
<td>$11,042</td>
<td>$11,758</td>
<td>$11,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>$3,150</td>
<td>$3,362</td>
<td>$3,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetes</td>
<td>$348</td>
<td>$371</td>
<td>$367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart disease</td>
<td>$2,338</td>
<td>$2,512</td>
<td>$2,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>$99</td>
<td>$95</td>
<td>$92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious diseases</td>
<td>$163</td>
<td>$176</td>
<td>$174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The bequest motive specification is described at the end of Appendix C1. These aggregate values were calculated using the 2015 US population by age. Column (1) presents estimates under the assumption that individuals have no annuities in retirement. Column (2) presents estimates under the assumption that individuals receive typical Social Security benefits that are financed by an earnings tax. Column (3) increases the generosity of Social Security by 50%, financed by an increase in the earnings tax. The net present value of individuals’ wealth at age 20 is the same across all three columns.
Appendix Figure 11. Medical spending for a healthy person versus a very sick patient

Notes: These data are provided by the Future Elderly Model. The health states are described in detail in Table 2.
A. Mathematical proofs of results from main text

Proof of Lemma 1:

Let $V(t, W(t), j)$ be taken as given (exogenous). Consider the deterministic optimization problem:

$$
V(0, W_0, i) = \max_{c_i(t)} \left\{ \int_0^T e^{-rt} \mathcal{S}(i, t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) dt \right\}
$$

subject to

$$
\frac{\partial W(t)}{\partial t} = rW(t) + m_i(t) - c_i(t)
$$

Denote the optimal value-to-go as

$$
\bar{V}(u, W(u), i) = \max_{c_i(t)} \left\{ \int_0^T e^{-rt} \mathcal{S}(i, t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) dt \right\}
$$

Setting $\bar{V}(t, W(t), i) = e^{-rt} \mathcal{S}(i, t) V(t, W(t), i)$ then demonstrates that $V(\cdot)$ satisfies the HJB (12) for $i$. See Parpas and Webster (2013) for additional details.

QED

Proof of Lemma 3:

The proof proceeds by induction on $i \leq n$. For the base case $i = n$, in which no state transitions are possible, the solution to the costate equation (given in the main text) simplifies to:

$$
p_t^{(n)} = \theta^{(n)} e^{-rt} = \exp \left\{ - \int_0^T \mu_n(s) ds \right\} u_c(c_n(t), q_n(t))
$$

$$
= \theta^{(n)} e^{-r(t-t)}
$$

$$
= p_t^{(n)} e^{-r(t-t)}
$$

$$
= \exp \left\{ - \int_0^T \mu_n(s) ds \right\} u_c(c_n(t), q_n(t)) e^{-r(t-t)}
$$

This then implies that

$$
u_c(c_n(t), q_n(t)) = e^{r(t-t)} e^{-\rho(t-t)} \exp \left\{ - \int_t^T \mu_n(s) ds \right\} u_c(c_n(t), q_n(t))
$$

which shows that the lemma holds for $i = n$.

For the induction step, suppose the lemma is true for $j > i$, $1 \leq i \leq n - 1$. For any subinterval $[0, \tau]$, the solution of the costate equation can be written as:

$$
p_t^{(i)} = \left[ \int_t^\tau e^{(r-\rho)s} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^s \mu_i(u) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(u) du \right\} \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \frac{\partial V(s, W(s), j)}{\partial W(s)} ds \right] e^{-rt} + \theta(t, i) e^{-rt}
$$

25 When no transitions are possible, this reduces to the deterministic model outlined in Section II.B.
where \( \theta(\tau, i) \) is a constant that depends on the choice of \( \tau \) and \( i \). (Take the derivative of \( p_t^{(i)} \) with respect to \( t \) to verify.) Evaluating equation (A1) at \( t = \tau \) and combining with equation (14) from the main text yields:

\[
p^{(i)}_\tau = \theta(\tau, i)e^{-\tau t} = \exp\left\{ -\int_0^\tau \rho + \overline{\mu}_i(s) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \, ds \right\} u_c(c_i(\tau), q_i(\tau))
\]

which implies

\[
\theta(\tau, i) = e^{(r-\rho)\tau} \exp\left\{ -\int_0^\tau \overline{\mu}_i(s) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \, ds \right\} u_c(c_i(\tau), q_i(\tau)) \tag{A2}
\]

Also, from equation (14) we know that:

\[
p^{(i)}_t = \exp\left\{ -\int_0^t \rho + \overline{\mu}_i(s) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \, ds \right\} u_c(c_i(t), q_i(t))
\]

Plugging equations (14) and (A2) into equation (A1) yields:

\[
\begin{align*}
&u_c(c_i(t), q_i(t)) \exp\left\{ -\int_0^t \rho + \overline{\mu}_i(s) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \, ds \right\} \\
&= \left[ \int_t^\tau e^{(r-\rho)s} \exp\left\{ -\int_0^s \overline{\mu}(u) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(u) \, du \right\} \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \frac{\partial V(s, W(s), j)}{\partial W(s)} \, ds \right] e^{-\tau t} \\
&\quad + e^{-\tau t} e^{(r-\rho)t} \exp\left\{ -\int_0^\tau \overline{\mu}_i(s) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \, ds \right\} u_c(c_i(\tau), q_i(\tau))
\end{align*}
\]

Since \( \frac{\partial V(s, W(s), j)}{\partial W(s)} = u_c(c_j(s), q_j(s)) \), we obtain:

\[
\begin{align*}
u_c(c_i(t), q_i(t)) &= \int_t^\tau e^{(r-\rho)(s-t)} \exp\left\{ -\int_t^s \overline{\mu}(u) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(u) \, du \right\} \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) u_c(c_j(s), q_j(s)) \, ds \\
&\quad + e^{(r-\rho)(t-t)} \exp\left\{ -\int_t^\tau \overline{\mu}_i(s) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \, ds \right\} u_c(c_i(\tau), q_i(\tau)) \\
&= \int_t^\tau e^{(r-\rho)(s-t)} \exp\left\{ -\int_t^s \overline{\mu}(u) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(u) \, du \right\} \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \mathbb{E}\left[ e^{(r-\rho)\tau-s} \exp\left\{ -\int_s^\tau \mu(s) \, ds \right\} u_c(c_j(\tau), q_j(\tau)) \right] \, ds \\
&\quad + e^{(r-\rho)(t-t)} \exp\left\{ -\int_t^\tau \overline{\mu}_i(s) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(s) \, ds \right\} u_c(c_i(\tau), q_i(\tau)) \\
&= \mathbb{E}\left[ e^{(r-\rho)(t-s)} \exp\left\{ -\int_t^\tau \mu(s) \, ds \right\} u_c(c_j(\tau), q_j(\tau)) \right] \bigg| Y_t = i
\end{align*}
\]

where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis.
QED

Proof of Proposition 4:

Choosing once again the Dirac delta function for $\delta(\cdot)$ in Lemma 2 yields

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{E} U}{\partial e} vert_{e=0} = \int_0^T e^{-pt} S(i, t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t), j) \right) dt$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-pt} S(t) u(c_{y_i}(t), q_{y_i}(t)) dt \bigg| Y_0 = i \right]$$

Dividing the result by the marginal utility of wealth at time $t = 0$ then yields the value of statistical life given by equation (15):

$$VSL(i) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-pt} S(t) u(c_{y_i}(t), q_{y_i}(t)) dt \bigg| Y_0 = i \right] = \int_0^T e^{-rt} v(i, t) dt$$

Applying Lemma 3 for $t = 0$ allows us to rewrite VSL as

$$VSL(i) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-pt} S(t) \frac{u(c_{y_i}(t), q_{y_i}(t))}{u(c_{y_0}(0), q_{y_0}(0))} dt \bigg| Y_0 = i \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-rt} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) ds \right\} u_c(c_{y_i}(t), q_{y_i}(t)) dt \bigg| Y_0 = i \right]$$

which by exchanging expectation and integration shows that the value of a life-year, $v(i, t)$, is equal to the expected utility of consumption normalized by the expected marginal utility of consumption:

$$v(i, t) = \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[ S(t) u \left( c_{y_i}(t), q_{y_i}(t) \right) \bigg| Y_0 = i \right]}{\mathbb{E} \left[ S(t) u_c \left( c_{y_i}(t), q_{y_i}(t) \right) \bigg| Y_0 = i \right]}$$

QED

Proof of Proposition 5:

The proposition assumes there are $n = 2$ states, with $\bar{\mu}_2(s) > \bar{\mu}_1(s) \forall s$. That is, health in state 2 is strictly worse than health in state 1. For simplicity, we abstract from quality of life, $q(t)$. Without loss of generality, we will prove the proposition for the case where the consumer transitions from state 1 to state 2 at time $t = 0$.

For state 2, the solution to the costate equation is:

$$p^{(2)}_t = \theta^{(2)} e^{-rt}$$

and from the first-order condition (14) we obtain:

$$p^{(2)}_t = e^{-pt} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \bar{\mu}_2(s) ds \right\} u_c(c_2(t))$$
The two preceding equations imply that
\[ u_c(c_2(t)) = \theta^{(2)} e^{(\rho - r)t} \exp \left\{ \int_0^t \mu_2(s) ds \right\} \]

For state 1, the costate equation is:
\[ p_t^{(1)} = -p_t^{(1)} r - e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu_1(s) + \lambda_{12}(s) ds \right\} \lambda_{12}(t) \frac{\partial W(t, W(t), 2)}{\partial W(t)} \]
\[ = -p_t^{(1)} r - e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu_1(s) + \lambda_{12}(s) ds \right\} \lambda_{12}(t) u_c(c_2(t)) \]
\[ = -p_t^{(1)} r - e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \lambda_{12}(s) ds \right\} \lambda_{12}(t) \theta^{(2)} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \rho \mu_2(s) - \mu_1(s) ds \right\} \]  \( (A3) \)

Before proceeding, we first prove the following two lemmas.

**Appendix Lemma A1:**

There exists a \( r \in [0, \mu_2] \) such that
\[ p_t^{(1)} \geq \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \lambda_{12}(s) ds \right\} p_t^{(2)} \]

**Proof of Appendix Lemma A1:**

Suppose by way of contradiction that \( p_t^{(1)} < \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \lambda_{12}(s) ds \right\} p_t^{(2)} \forall t \in [0, T] \). Then, since \( \mu_2(s) > \mu_1(s) \) we have
\[ e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu_2(s) ds \right\} p_t^{(1)} < e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu_1(s) ds \right\} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \lambda_{12}(s) ds \right\} p_t^{(2)} \]

Rearranging then yields
\[ u_c(c_1(t)) = \frac{p_t^{(1)}}{e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu_1(s) ds \right\} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \lambda_{12}(s) ds \right\}} < \frac{p_t^{(2)}}{e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu_2(s) ds \right\}} = u_c(c_2(t)) \]

which implies \( c_2(t) < c_1(t) \forall t \). But then we have a contradiction: \( c_2(t) \) cannot be an optimal consumption plan because the feasible consumption plan \( c_1(t) \) strictly dominates \( c_2(t) \).

**QED**

**Appendix Lemma A2:**

\[ p_0^{(1)} > \theta^{(2)} = p_0^{(2)} \]

**Proof of Appendix Lemma A2:**

Define
\[ g(t) = \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t r + \lambda_{12}(s) ds \right\} \theta^{(2)} = \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \lambda_{12}(s) ds \right\} p_t^{(2)} \]

Differentiating with respect to \( t \) yields
\[
\dot{g}(t) = -g(t)r - \exp\left\{ -rt - \int_0^t \lambda_{12}(s)ds \right\} \lambda_{12}(t)\theta^{(2)}
\]

Combining this result with equation (A3) then yields the following inequality:

\[
p_{t}^{(1)}(1) < \phi\left(p_{t}^{(1)}, t\right)
\]

Suppose by way of contradiction that \(p_{t}^{(1)} < \theta^{(2)} = g(0)\). Then by standard comparison arguments for ordinary differential equations, we have

\[
p_{t}^{(1)} < g(t) = \exp\left\{ -\int_0^t \lambda_{12}(s)ds \right\} p_{t}^{(2)} \quad \forall t \in [0,T],
\]

which is a contradiction to the result from Appendix Lemma A1.

\textbf{QED}

Thus, we have

\[
u_{c}(c_{1}(0)) = p_{0}^{(1)} > p_{0}^{(2)} = u_{c}(c_{2}(0))
\]

which implies

\[
c_{2}(0) > c_{1}(0)
\]

\textbf{QED}

\textbf{Proof of Proposition 6:}

Without loss of generality, consider the case \(t = 0\). From Proposition 5 and Appendix Lemmas A1 and A2, it is clear that \(c_{1}(t)\) and \(c_{2}(t)\) are decreasing, \(c_{2}(0) > c_{1}(0)\), \(c_{2}(t) \geq c_{1}(t)\) for \(t \leq t_{0}\), and \(c_{2}(t) \leq c_{1}(t)\) for \(t > t_{0}\). Making use of the assumption that no state transitions occur for \(t > 0\), we have that

\[
VSL(2,0) = \int_0^T e^{-rt} \frac{S_{2}(t)u(c_{2}(t))}{S_{2}(t)u_{c}(c_{2}(t))} dt
\]

and

\[
VSL(1,0) = \int_0^T e^{-rt} \frac{u(c_{1}(t))}{u_{c}(c_{1}(t))} dt
\]

Let \(Y(x) = \frac{u(x)}{u_{c}(x)}\). Under the stated assumptions, we have that

\[
Y'(x) = 1 - \frac{u(x)u_{cc}(x)}{(u_{c}(x))^2} > 0,
\]

\[
Y''(x) = \frac{2(u_{cc}(x))^2 u(x) - u_{x}^{2}(x)u_{cc}(x) - u_{x}(x)u(x)u_{ccc}(x)}{(u_{c}(x))^3} > 0
\]

Employing Taylor’s theorem then yields:
\[
VSL(2,0) = \int_0^T e^{-rt} Y(c_2(t)) \, dt \\
= \int_0^T e^{-rt} \left[ Y(c_1(t)) + [c_2(t) - c_1(t)]Y'(c_1(t)) + \frac{1}{2} [c_2(t) - c_1(t)]^2 Y''(\xi(t)) \right] \, dt \\
> \int_0^T e^{-rt} Y(c_1(t)) \, dt + \int_0^T e^{-rt} Y'(c_1(t)) [c_2(t) - c_1(t)] \, dt \\
+ \int_{t_0}^T e^{-rt} Y'(c_1(t)) [c_2(t) - c_1(t)] \, dt \\
> \int_0^T e^{-rt} Y(c_1(t)) \, dt + \int_0^{t_0} e^{-rt} Y'(c_1(t_0))[c_2(t) - c_1(t)] \, dt \\
+ \int_{t_0}^T e^{-rt} Y'(c_1(t_0))[c_2(t) - c_1(t)] \, dt \\
= \int_0^T e^{-rt} Y(c_1(t)) \, dt \\
= VSL(1,0)
\]

where the final step follows from the budget constraint.

QED
B. Data

B1. Earnings
We obtain earnings data for employed individuals under the age of 65 from the 2016 Current Population Survey (CPS).\textsuperscript{26} We also obtain earnings data for respondents over the age of 55 from the 2014 Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). For both surveys, the data represent earnings before taxes and other deductions, and include wages, salaries, and tips. The HRS earnings data also include self-employment income. (The CPS data exclude self-employed individuals.)

The CPS earnings data are binned into the following age groups: 16-19, 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64. We collapse the HRS earnings data into the following age groups: 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, 85-94, and 95-104. The resulting estimates are plotted in Appendix Figure 1. We smooth the data by fitting it to a quartic polynomial, and include an indicator variable for ages over 65. The dependent variable in the regression is the CPS earnings estimate for ages under 65, and the HRS estimate for ages over 65. Finally, we constrain the fitted prediction to be non-negative.

Appendix Figure B1. Annual earnings estimates from CPS and HRS

Notes: Figure plots annual earnings by midpoint of age group as estimated by the 2016 Current Population Survey (CPS) for respondents under age 65 and the 2014 Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) for respondents over age 55.

\textsuperscript{26} These data are available at http://data.bls.gov/pdq/querytool.jsp?survey=le.
The fitted line corresponds to a regression of annual earnings on a quartic polynomial in age and an indicator equal to 1 for ages 65 and over. The dependent variable, annual earnings, corresponds to CPS estimates for ages under 65 and HRS estimates for ages over 65.

**B2. Future Elderly Model (FEM)**

The FEM follows Americans aged 50 years and older and projects their health and medical spending over time. A complete technical document detailing the FEM is available online. The FEM is a microsimulation that follows the evolution of individual-level health trajectories and economic outcomes, rather than the average or aggregate characteristics of a cohort. The FEM has three core modules. The first is the Replenishing Cohorts module, which predicts economic and health outcomes of new cohorts of 50-year-olds with data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and incorporates trends in disease and trends in other outcomes based on data from external sources, such as National Health Interview Survey and the American Community Survey. This module generates cohorts as the simulation proceeds, so that we can measure outcomes for the age 50+ population in any given year.

The second component is the Health Transition module, which uses the longitudinal structure of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to calculate transition probabilities across various health states, including chronic conditions, functional status, body-mass index and mortality, using linear and nonlinear multivariate regression models. These transition probabilities depend on a battery of predictors: age, sex, education, race, ethnicity, smoking behavior, marital status, employment and health conditions. Baseline factors are also controlled for using a series of initial health variables measured at age 50. FEM transitions produce a large set of simulated outcomes, including diabetes, high-blood pressure, heart disease, cancer (except skin cancer), stroke or transient ischemic attack, and lung disease (either or both chronic bronchitis and emphysema), disability, and body-mass index. Disability is measured by limitations in instrumental activities of daily living, activities of daily living, and residence in a nursing home. This dynamic simulation method has undergone extensive benchmarking and validation.

Finally, the Policy Outcomes module combines individual-level outcomes into aggregate outcomes, such as medical care costs (Medicare, Medicaid and Private), federal, state and property taxes, Social Security expenditures and contributions. Individual health spending is predicted with regard to health status (chronic conditions and functional status), demographics (age, sex, race, ethnicity and education), nursing home status and mortality. Estimates are based on spending data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey for individuals aged 64 and younger and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey for individuals aged 65 and older, who constitute the bulk of the Medicare population. This module has been comprehensively tested against national aggregates.

An example of how the three modules interact is as follows. For year 2014, the model begins with the population of Americans aged 50 and older based on nationally representative data from the HRS. Individual-level health and economic outcomes for the next two years are predicted using the Policy Outcomes module. The cohort is then aged two years using the Health Transition Module. Aggregate health and functional status outcomes for those years are then calculated. At that point, a new cohort of 50-year-olds is introduced into the 2016 population using the Replenishing Cohort module, and they join those who survived from 2014 to 2016. This forms the age 50+ population for 2016. The transition model is then applied to this population. The same process is repeated until reaching the last year of the simulation.

27 A complete technical description is available at roybalhealthpolicy.usc.edu/fem/technical-specifications/.
C. Derivations for numerical models

Appendix C1 provides details regarding the implementation of the deterministic mortality model employed in Section IV.B, and explains how it is used to derive the aggregate insurance value of Social Security. This model is estimated numerically using standard dynamic programming methods.

Appendix C2 provides a derivation of the stochastic mortality model employed in Section IV.C. This model is solved analytically and thus provides exact solutions.

C1. Deterministic mortality

The value function is defined as:

\[ V(t, W(t)) = \max_{\{c(t)\}} \sum_{s=t}^{T} e^{-\rho(s-t)} S_t(s) u(c(s)) \]

We can use the value function to rewrite the optimization problem as a recursive Bellman equation:

\[ V(t, W(t)) = \max_{\{c(t)\}} u(c(t)) + \frac{1 - d(t)}{e^\rho} V(t + 1, W(t + 1)) \]

Because the problem is finite, we can work backwards from the final period. We discretize the state space into \( N_w = 3,000 \) points evenly distributed across the interval \([0, W_{max}]\). Let that set of values be \( \{W_n\} \).

Define \( g_t(W(t)) = W(t + 1) \) as a mapping from the current wealth state, \( W(t) \), to the optimal wealth state in the following period, \( W(t + 1) \).

It is clear that the consumer should consume all her wealth in the final period, i.e., \( g_T(W(T)) = 0 \) for all \( W(T) \in \{W_n\} \). This implies that \( V(T, W(T)) = u(W(T) + y(T)) \) for all \( W(T) \in \{W_n\} \).

Next, we calculate \( V(T - 1, W_{T-1}) = \max_{g(W_{T-1})=W_T} u(W(T - 1) + y(T - 1) - W(T)/e^\gamma) + \frac{1 - d(t+1)}{e^\rho} V(T, W(T)) \). In other words, for each \( W(T - 1) \in \{W_n\} \), we calculate the optimal \( V(T - 1, W(T - 1)) \) by determining which choice of \( g_{T-1}(W(T - 1)) = W(T) \in \{W_n\} \) will maximize utility. This algorithm is then repeated for \( t = T - 2, T - 3, \ldots, 1 \).

Given the initial condition, \( W_1 \), we can then employ our results to calculate \( W(2) = g_1(W(1)), W(3) = g_2(W(2)), \ldots, W(T) \). Period consumption, \( c(t) \), is then calculated using the equation for the budget constraint. Finally, we the analytical formulas derived in the main text to calculate the value of statistical life.

When accounting for a bequest motive, we follow Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) and assume the utility from leaving a bequest is linear in wealth:

\[ V_t(w_t) = \max_{\{c_t\}} u(c_t) + \frac{1}{1 + \rho} [(1 - q_t)V_{t+1}(w_{t+1}) + q_taw_{t+1}] \]

Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) estimate that the constant \( a^{-\gamma} \) is approximately equal to $50,000, where \( \gamma \) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion from a CRRA utility function. We adopt a (stronger) estimate of $35,000 when accounting for a bequest motive. This parameterization implies that the marginal utility of consumption is less than the marginal utility of leaving a bequest when consumption in the last year of life is more than $35,000.
Insurance value of Social Security

We calculate the insurance value of Social Security at all ages by estimating its wealth equivalence. That is, we follow Mitchell et al. (1999) and estimate the amount of wealth, $W^*$, required to equalize the utilities of a non-annuitized individual and an individual with Social Security. In other words, we solve for compensating wealth at age $t$, $W^*(t)$, such that $V(t, W(t) + W^*(t)) = V^{SS}(t, W^{SS}(t))$. Wealth for a non-annuitized individual, $W(t)$, and wealth for an individual with Social Security, $W^{SS}(t)$, are calculated by the deterministic model for the first two policy scenarios discussed in the main text.

We solve for $W^*(t)$ by applying a numerical search algorithm. We estimate that, at age 65, having access to Social Security is equivalent to an increase in wealth of 16.5 percent for a non-annuitized individual. By way of comparison, Mitchell et al. (1999) estimate the before-tax value of full (complete) annuitization at age 65 to be 37.4 percent of wealth, using the same parameters for risk aversion, interest rate, and the discount rate.

The aggregate insurance value of Social Security is then calculated by aggregating over the 2015 US population:

$$ Aggregate Value SS = \sum_{a=0}^{110} W^*(a)f(a) $$

C2. Stochastic mortality

We focus on the case where the consumer does not have access to annuities. We ignore income, and assume that all of consumer’s wealth is available at time $t = 0$. This will allow us to generate an analytic solution to the consumer’s problem, given by:

$$ \max_{\{c_t\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{T} e^{-\rho t} S_0(t)u\left(c(t), q_{Y_t}(t)\right) + e^{-\rho(t+1)} \left((S_0(t) - S_0(t + 1))u(W(t + 1), b_t)\right) \right] $$

where

$W(0)$ given,

$W(t) \geq 0$,

$W(t + 1) = (W(t) - c(t))e^{r(t,Y_t)}$

Here, $Y_t$ denotes the consumer’s health state at time $t$, and we allow the interest rate to depend on it so as to model health-related wealth shocks. Of course, a constant interest rate $r(t,i) = r$ is included as a special case. The parameter $b_t$ measure the bequest motive. The utility function is

$$ u(c, q) = q \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - q \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} $$

where $\underline{c}$ is the subsistence level of consumption for a healthy person. Because optimal consumption is unaffected by affine transformations of utility, we will assume $u(c, q) = q c^{1-\gamma} / (1 - \gamma)$ when solving the model for consumption.

Define the value function
\[ V(t, W(t), Y_t) = \max_{c_t} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{s=t}^{T} e^{-\rho(s-t)} S_t(s) u \left( c(s), q_s(s) \right) + e^{-\rho(s+1-t)} \left( S_t(s) - S_t(s+1) \right) u(W(s+1), b_{s+1}) \right] Y_t \]

subject to

\[ W(s + 1) = (W(s) - c(s)) e^{r(s,Y_s)}, s > t, W(s) \geq 0 \]

Then we obtain the following Bellman equation:

\[
V(t, w, i) = \max_{c_t} \left\{ u(c(t), q_i(t)) + e^{-\rho} \bar{d}_i(t) u \left( (w - c(t)) e^{r(t,i)}, b_t \right) + \right.
\]

\[ + e^{-\rho} \left( 1 - \bar{d}_i(t) \right) \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_{ij}(t)V(t + 1, (w - c(t)) e^{r(t,j)}, j) \right\} 
\]

**Appendix Proposition C1:**

The value function and the optimal consumption level satisfy

\[ V(t, w, i) = \frac{w^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} K_{t,i}, \]

\[ c^*(t, w, i) = w \cdot c_{t,i} \]

where

\[ c_{t,i} = \left[ 1 + e^{-r(t,i)} \left( \frac{e^{r(t,i)} \left( \bar{d}_i(t) b_t + \left( 1 - \bar{d}_i(t) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_{ij}(t) K_{t+1,j} \right) \right) \right)}{e^{\rho} q_i(t)} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}, t < T, \]

\[ c_{T,i} = \left[ 1 + e^{-r(T,i)} \left( \frac{e^{r(T,i)} b_T}{e^{\rho} q_i(T)} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \]

and \( K_{t,i} \) satisfies the recursion:

\[ K_{t,i} = \left[ q_i(t)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} + e^{-r(t,i)} \left( \bar{d}_i(t) b_t + \left( 1 - \bar{d}_i(t) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_{ij}(t) K_{t+1,j} \right) \right) \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \]

\[ K_{T,i} = q_i(T)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} + e^{-r(T,i)} \left( e^{r(T,i)-\rho} b_T \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \]

**Proof of Appendix Proposition C1:** see end of appendix C

When calculating VSL, we incorporate subsistence consumption back into the utility function. We then obtain for the value function:
Appendix Lemma C2:

To evaluate this expression for VSL, we will make use of the following lemma. When bequests are absent and \( r(t, i) = r \), we drop the term (*) and the theory presented in the main text yields the following expression for VSL:

\[
VSL_i = \frac{V(0, w, i)}{u_c(c_i(0), q_i(0))} = \frac{V(0, w, i)}{V_i(w, i)}
\]

Let

\[
V(0, w, i) = \sum_{t=0}^{T} e^{-\rho t} \mathbb{E}_{0,i} \left[ \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) ds \right\} \left( q_{t+1} q_{t+1} c(t) \frac{c(t)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \frac{c^1-\gamma}{1-\gamma} \right) + e^{-\rho(t+1)} b_t \mathbb{E}_{0,i} \left[ \left( \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) ds \right\} - \exp \left\{ - \int_0^{t+1} \mu(s) ds \right\} \right) b_t \frac{W(t + 1)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \right] \right]
\]

In specifications without the bequest motive, the second term (*) is dropped. Rearranging yields:

\[
V(0, w, i) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} e^{-\rho t} \mathbb{E}_{0,i} \left[ \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) ds \right\} q_{t+1} c(t) \frac{c(t)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + e^{-\rho(t+1)} b_t \mathbb{E}_{0,i} \left[ \left( \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) ds \right\} - \exp \left\{ - \int_0^{t+1} \mu(s) ds \right\} \right) b_t \frac{W(t + 1)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \right] \right]
\]

We can then calculate VSL in state \( i \) using the following formula:

\[
VSL_i = \frac{V(0, w, i)}{u(c(0), q(0))} = \frac{V(0, w, i)}{V_i(w, i)}
\]

To evaluate this expression for VSL, we will make use of the following lemma.

**Appendix Lemma C2:** Let \( W_{t,j}(\psi) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) ds \right\} W(t)^r 1(Y_t = j) \right] Y_0 \) for \( \psi \in (1, \infty) \). Then \( W_{t,j}(\psi) \) satisfies the following recursion:
Proof of Appendix Lemma C2: see end of appendix C

Note that for \( \Psi = 0 \), the expression \( \sum_{j=1}^{n} W_{t,j}(0) = \mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left\{-\int_0^T \mu(s) ds\right\}|Y_0\right] \) is simply the \( t \)-year survival probability. Using this Appendix Lemma C2, we obtain:

**Appendix Proposition C3:**

\[
VSL_{Y_0} = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \sum_{t=0}^{T} e^{-rt} \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} q_j(t)c_{t,j}^{1-\gamma} W_{t,j}(1 - \gamma) - \sum_{j=1}^{n} W_{t,j}(0)}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} q_j(t)c_{t,j}^{1-\gamma} W_{t,j}(-\gamma)} \\
\]

Proof of Appendix Proposition C3: see end of appendix C

We also immediately obtain the following corollary:

**Appendix Corollary C4:**

\[
VSL_{i,j} = VSL_i - VSL_j \left(\frac{q_j(0)c_{0,j}^{\gamma}}{q_i(0)c_{0,i}^{\gamma}}\right)
\]

\[
= VSL_i \left(\frac{q_j(0)}{q_i(0)}\right) \left(\frac{c_{0,i}}{c_{0,j}}\right)^\gamma VSL_j
\]
Proofs for Appendix C

Proof of Appendix Proposition C1:

The proof proceeds by induction on \( \theta \geq \eta \).

For the base case \( \theta = \eta \), note that \( \vec{d}(t) = 1 \), so that the first-order condition from the Bellman equation gives:

\[
q_i(T)c(T)^{-\gamma} = e^{r(T,i) - \rho}b_T(w - c(T))^{-\gamma}e^{-r(T,i)\gamma}
\]

This implies that

\[
c(T) = \frac{we^{r(T,i)\gamma} \left( \frac{q_i(T)}{b_T} \right)^{\gamma}}{1 + e^{r(T,i)\gamma} \left( \frac{q_i(T)}{b_T} \right)}
\]

\[
= w \left[ 1 + e^{-r(T,i)} \left( e^{r(T,i)\gamma} \right)^{1-\gamma} \right]
\]

So that:

\[
V(T,w,i) = \frac{w^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \left( q_i(T)c_{T,i}^{1-\gamma} + e^{-\rho}b_T e^{r(T,i)(1-\gamma)}(1 - c_{T,i})^{1-\gamma} \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{b_T^{\gamma}} + e^{r(T,i)\gamma} \left( \frac{q_i(T)}{b_T} \right)^{1-\gamma}
\]

\[
= \left[ q_i(T)^{1-\gamma} + e^{-r(T,i)} \left( e^{r(T,i)\gamma} \right)^{1-\gamma} \right]
\]

For the induction step, suppose the proposition is true for case \( \theta + 1 \). We have

\[
V(t,w,i) = \max_{c} \left\{ q_i(t) c^{1-\gamma} \right\}
\]

From the first-order condition we obtain:

\[
q_i(t)c^{-\gamma} = b_t e^{r(t,i) - \rho} \vec{d}_i(t) e^{r(t,i)\gamma} (w - c)^{-\gamma} + e^{r(t,i) - \rho} \left( 1 - \vec{d}_i(t) \right) e^{-r(t,i)(w - c)^{-\gamma}} \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_{ij}(t) K_{t+1,j}
\]

Rearranging yields:

\[
q_i(t)c^{-\gamma} = (w - c)^{-\gamma} e^{r(t,i) - \rho} e^{-r(t,i)\gamma} \left[ \vec{d}_i(t)b_t + \left( 1 - \vec{d}_i(t) \right) \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_{ij}(t) K_{t+1,j} \right]
\]

which implies:
$$q_i(t)^{-1/\gamma}c = (w - c)e^{(\rho - r(t,i))/\gamma}e^{r(t,i)} \left[ \bar{d}_i(t)b_t + \left(1 - \bar{d}_i(t)\right) \sum_{j=i}^n p_{ij}(t)K_{t+1,j} \right]^{-1/\gamma}$$

Rearranging further yields:

$$c = w \frac{e^{r(t,i)} \left[ \bar{d}_i(t)b_t + \left(1 - \bar{d}_i(t)\right) \sum_{j=i}^n p_{ij}(t)K_{t+1,j} \right]^{-1/\gamma}}{e^{\rho q_i(t)^{-1/\gamma} + e^{r(t,i)} \left[ \bar{d}_i(t)b_t + \left(1 - \bar{d}_i(t)\right) \sum_{j=i}^n p_{ij}(t)K_{t+1,j} \right]^{-1/\gamma}}}$$

$$= w \left[ 1 + e^{-r(t,i)} \left( \frac{e^{r(t,i)} \left[ \bar{d}_i(t)b_t + \left(1 - \bar{d}_i(t)\right) \sum_{j=i}^n p_{ij}(t)K_{t+1,j} \right]^{-1/\gamma}}{e^{\rho q_i(t)}} \right) \right]^{-1/\gamma}$$

Thus we obtain:

$$V(t,w,i) = q_i(t)c_{t,i}^{1-\gamma} + b_t e^{-r(t,i)} \left[ \bar{d}_i(t)b_t + \left(1 - \bar{d}_i(t)\right) \sum_{j=i}^n p_{ij}(t)K_{t+1,j} \right]^{-1/\gamma} + e^{-\rho \left(1 - c_{t,j}\right)^{1-\gamma} e^{r(t,i)(1-\gamma)} \left[ \bar{d}_i(t)b_t + \left(1 - \bar{d}_i(t)\right) \sum_{j=i}^n p_{ij}(t)K_{t+1,j} \right]^{-1/\gamma}}$$

$$= w^{1-\gamma} \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \left[ q_i(t)c_{t,i}^{1-\gamma} + e^{-\rho \left(1 - c_{t,j}\right)^{1-\gamma} e^{r(t,i)(1-\gamma)} \left[ \bar{d}_i(t)b_t + \left(1 - \bar{d}_i(t)\right) \sum_{j=i}^n p_{ij}(t)K_{t+1,j} \right]^{-1/\gamma}} \right]$$

$$= w^{1-\gamma} \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \left[ q_i(t)c_{t,i}^{1-\gamma} + e^{-\rho \left(1 - c_{t,j}\right)^{1-\gamma} e^{r(t,i)(1-\gamma)} \left[ \bar{d}_i(t)b_t + \left(1 - \bar{d}_i(t)\right) \sum_{j=i}^n p_{ij}(t)K_{t+1,j} \right]^{-1/\gamma}} \right]^{-1/\gamma}$$

$$= \frac{w^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} \left[ e^\gamma \left[ \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \right] \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \right]$$

$$QED$$

Proof of Appendix Lemma C2:

$$W_{t+1,j}(\Psi) = E \left[ \exp \left\{ - \int_0^{t+1} \mu(s)ds \right\} \left( W(t + 1) \right)^\Psi 1\{Y_{t+1} = j\} \right]$$

$$= E \left[ \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s)ds \right\} \left( (W(t) - c(t))e^\gamma \right)^\Psi 1\{Y_{t+1} = j\} \exp \left\{ - \int_t^{t+1} \mu(s)ds \right\} \right]$$
\[
= \sum_{k=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} \left[ 1(\gamma_{t} = k) \exp \left\{ - \int_{0}^{t} \mu(s) ds \right\} e^{r\Psi} W(t)^{\Psi} \left( 1 - c_{t,k} \right)^{\Psi} \mathbb{E} \left[ 1(\gamma_{t+1} = j) \exp \left\{ - \int_{t}^{t+1} \mu(s) ds \right\} Y_{t} = k \right] \right] \\
= e^{r\Psi} \sum_{k=1}^{n} W_{t,k}(\gamma) \left( 1 - c_{t,k} \right)^{\Psi} \left( 1 - \dd_{k}(t) \right) p_{k,j}(t)
\]

QED

**Proof of Appendix Proposition C3:**

Note that we have

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left\{ - \int_{0}^{t} \mu(s) ds \right\} q_{\gamma}(t) c(t)^{\Psi} \right] = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left\{ - \int_{0}^{t} \mu(s) ds \right\} q_{\gamma}(t) c(t)^{\Psi} 1(\gamma_{t} = j) \right] \\
= \sum_{j=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left\{ - \int_{0}^{t} \mu(s) ds \right\} q_j(t) c_{t,j}^{\Psi} W(t)^{\Psi} 1(\gamma_{t} = j) \right] \\
= \sum_{j=1}^{n} q_j(t) c_{t,j}^{\Psi} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left\{ - \int_{0}^{t} \mu(s) ds \right\} W(t)^{\Psi} 1(\gamma_{t} = j) \middle| W_{t,j}(\Psi) \right]
\]

The proof follows by setting \( \Psi = 1 - \gamma, 0, \) and \( -\gamma \) in the expression for VSL.

QED
D. The fully annuitized value of life when mortality is stochastic

Even when mortality is stochastic, a complete annuities market allows the consumer to fully insure against mortality risk. We assume a full menu of actuarially fair annuities is available where consumers can choose consumption streams, \( c_{Y_t}(t) \), that depend on the health state, \( Y_t \). The consumer’s maximization problem is:

\[
\max_{c_{Y_t}(t)} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} S(t) u(c_{Y_t}(t), q_{Y_t}(t)) dt \bigg| Y_0 \right] \tag{20}
\]

subject to:

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-r t} S(t) c_{Y_t}(t) dt \bigg| Y_0 \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ W_0 + \int_0^T e^{-r t} S(t) m_{Y_t}(t) dt \bigg| Y_0 \right] \equiv \bar{W}(0, Y_0)
\]

where the net present value of wealth and future earnings at time \( t \) in state \( i \) is \( \bar{W}(t, i) \), and \( S(t) \) is defined as before. Define the consumer’s objective function at time \( u \) as:

\[
f(u, i) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^{T-u} e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ -\int_0^t \mu(u + s) ds \right\} u(c_{Y_{u+t}}(u + t), q_{Y_{u+t}}(u + t)) dt \bigg| Y_u = i \right] \tag{21}
\]

We can write the objective function (21) recursively as:

\[
f(u, i) = \int_0^{T-u} e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ -\int_0^t \mu(u + s) ds \right\} \left( u(c_t(u + t), q_t(u + t)) \right.

\left. + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(u + t) f(u + t, j) \right) dt
\]

Similarly, current wealth at time \( u \) in state \( i \), including the value of future labor income, pays for future consumption such that:

\[
\bar{W}(u, i) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^{T-u} e^{-r t} \exp \left\{ -\int_0^t \mu(u + s) ds \right\} c_{Y_{u+t}}(u + t) dt \bigg| Y_u = i \right]

= \int_0^{T-u} e^{-r t} \exp \left\{ -\int_0^t \bar{\mu}(u + s) ds \right\} \left( c_t(u + t) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(u + t) \bar{W}(u + t, j) \right) dt
\]

This in turn implies:

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{W}(t, i)}{\partial t} = \left( r + \bar{\mu}_i(t) \right) \bar{W}(t, i) - c_t(t) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) \left[ \bar{W}(t, i) - \bar{W}(t, j) \right]
\]

Define the optimal value function as:

\[
V(t, \bar{W}_t, Y_t) = \max_{\{c_{Y_t(s), s \geq t}\}} \{ f(t, Y_t) \}
\]

where \( \bar{W}_t = (\bar{W}(t, 1), \ldots, \bar{W}(t, n)) \). Under conventional regularity conditions, we know that if \( V \) and its partial derivatives are continuous, then \( V \) satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) system of equations:
\[
(\rho + \bar{r}_i(t)) V(t, \bar{W}_t, i)
\]
\[
= \max_{c_i(t)} \left\{ u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) \right. \\
+ \sum_{k=1}^{n} \frac{\partial V(t, \bar{W}_t, i)}{\partial \bar{W}(t, k)} \left[ (r + \bar{r}_k(t)) \bar{W}(t, k) - c_k(t) + \sum_{l \neq k} \lambda_{kl}(t) [\bar{W}(t, k) - \bar{W}(t, l)] \right] \\
+ \frac{\partial V(t, \bar{W}_t, i)}{\partial t} + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) \left[ V(t, \bar{W}_t, j) - V(t, \bar{W}_t, i) \right], 1 \leq i \leq n
\]

We are interested in understanding how optimal consumption, and thus the value of life, changes over the life-cycle in this problem. Similarly to the uninsured case in the main text, we follow Parpas and Webster (2013), who demonstrate that it is possible to reformulate a stochastic optimization problem as a deterministic problem that takes
\[
\left[ \bar{W}(t, i), \bar{W}(t, j) \right], j \neq i,
\]
along with the corresponding optimal policies, as exogenous. This then allows us to apply the maximum principle and derive analytic expressions.

**Appendix Lemma D1:**

The optimal value function for
\[
V_0(0, \bar{W}_0, i) = \max_{c_i(t)} \left\{ \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} S(i, t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, \bar{W}_t, j) \right) dt \right\}
\]
\[
\text{s.t.} \quad \frac{\partial \bar{W}(t, j)}{\partial t} = (r + \bar{r}_j(t)) \bar{W}(t, j) - c_j(t) + \sum_{k \neq j} \lambda_{jk}(t) [\bar{W}(t, j) - \bar{W}(t, k)], j = 1, ..., n
\]

where \( V(t, \bar{W}_t, j) \) and \( c_j(t), j \neq i \), are taken as exogenous.

**Proof of Appendix Lemma D1:** see end of Appendix D

Following Bertsekas (2005), the Hamiltonian for the (deterministic) maximization problem (23) is:

\[
H(\bar{W}_t, c_i(t), p_t) = e^{-\rho t} S(i, t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, \bar{W}_t, j) \right) \\
+ \sum_{k=1}^{n} p_t^{(k)} \left[ (r + \bar{r}_k(t)) \bar{W}(t, k) - c_k(t) + \sum_{l \neq k} \lambda_{kl}(t) [\bar{W}(t, k) - \bar{W}(t, l)] \right]
\]

where \( p_t^{(k)} \) is the costate variable corresponding to wealth \( \bar{W}(t, k) \).

**Appendix Lemma D2:**

The consumer’s first-order condition for the Hamiltonian (24) for \( Y_0 = i \) is

\[
e^{(r-\rho)t} u_c(c_i(t), q_i(t)) = \theta
\]

where \( \theta = \partial V(0, \bar{W}_0, i)/\partial \bar{W}(0, i) \) is equal to the marginal utility of wealth.

**Proof of Appendix Lemma D2:** see end of Appendix D
To analyze the value of life, we again let $\delta(t)$ be a perturbation on the mortality rate with $\int_0^T \delta(t)dt = 1$. As in the deterministic case, we will first derive the marginal utility of the life extension associated with this perturbation.

**Appendix Proposition D3:**

The marginal utility of life extension takes the same form as in the deterministic case:

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial e} \mid_{e=0} = E \left[ \int_0^T \left( e^{-\rho t} u(c_{Y_t}(t), q_{Y_t}(t)) + e^{-rt} \theta (m_{Y_t}(t) - c_{Y_t}(t)) \right) \left( \int_0^t \delta(s) ds \right) S(t) dt \bigg| Y_0 \right]$$

**Proof of Appendix Proposition D3:** see end of Appendix D

Choosing again the Dirac delta function for $\delta(\cdot)$ and dividing the result by the marginal utility of wealth, $\theta$, yields the value of statistical life:

$$VSL = E \left[ \int_0^T e^{-rt} S(t) v_{\gamma_t}(t) dt \bigg| Y_0 \right]$$

(26)

where the value of a statistical life-year is:

$$v_{\gamma_t}(t) = \frac{u(c_{\gamma_t}(t), q_{\gamma_t}(t))}{u_c(c_{\gamma_t}(t), q_{\gamma_t}(t))} + m_{\gamma_t}(t) - c_{\gamma_t}(t)$$

Comparing (26) to (3) reveals that stochastic mortality does not alter the basic expression for $VSL$. Consumers continue to discount future life-years by the rate of interest and by survival. One notable difference is that stochastic mortality generates variance in the value of life, which can now increase or decrease following the transition to a new health state.

We can obtain the life-cycle profile of consumption by differentiating the first-order condition (25) with respect to $t$. Doing so confirms that, as in the deterministic case, annuitization insulates consumption from mortality risk: 28

$$\frac{\dot{c}_{Y_t}}{c_{Y_t}} = \frac{\dot{c}}{c} = \sigma (r - \rho) + \sigma \eta \frac{\dot{q}}{q}$$

Our results demonstrate that stochastic mortality, by itself, does not alter the basic insights regarding VSL offered by the prior literature as long as one maintains the assumption of full annuitization.

A novel feature of the stochastic model is that it permits an investigation into the value of prevention, i.e., the value of a reduction in the probability of transitioning to a different health state. This is not possible in a deterministic environment, where there is implicitly only one health state.

To analyze the value of prevention, let $\delta_{ij}(t)$ be a perturbation on $\lambda_{ij}(t)$, where $\sum_{j\neq i} \int_0^T \delta_{ij}(t) dt = 1$. As in the life-extension case, it is helpful to choose the Dirac delta function for $\delta(\cdot)$, so that the probability is

---

28 We assume—like all prior studies—that full indemnity healthcare insurance is available, which is equivalent to assuming that $q(t)$ is independent of the health state. Without this assumption, sudden decreases in $q$ could cause the value of life to jump (Lakdawalla, Malani, and Reif 2017).
perturbed at $t = 0$ and remains unaffected otherwise. It is also helpful to consider a reduction in the transition probability for only one alternative state, $j_0$, so that $\delta_{ij}(t) = 0 \forall j \neq j_0$.

**Appendix Proposition D4:**

Define the value of statistical illness, $VSI(i,j_0)$, to be the value of marginal reduction in the probability of transitioning to state $j_0$ when in state $i$. This value is equal to:

$$VSI(i,j_0) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-rt} \left\{ \frac{u(c_Y(t),q_Y(t))}{u_c(c_Y(t),q_Y(t))} + m(t) - c(t) \right\} S(t) dt \bigg| Y_0 = i \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-rt} \left\{ \frac{u(c_Y(t),q_Y(t))}{u_c(c_Y(t),q_Y(t))} + m(t) - c(t) \right\} S(t) dt \bigg| Y_0 = j_0 \right]$$

$$= VSL(i) - VSL(j_0|W(0) = W^*)$$

where $W^*$ is the value of the annuity that was initially purchased in state $i$ that promised the state-contingent consumption stream $c_Y^*(t)$:

$$W^* = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-rt} S(t)c_Y^*(t) dt \bigg| Y_0 = j_0 \right]$$

**Proof of Appendix Proposition D4:** see end of Appendix D

The notation in equation (27) indicates that $VSL$ in state $j_0$ is evaluated under the assumption that the consumer’s annuity was purchased when she was in state $i$. If life expectancy in state $j_0$ is lower than in state $i$, the value of the annuity to the consumer falls.
Proofs for Appendix C

Proof of Appendix Lemma D1:

Let $\mathcal{X} \left( \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S} \right)$ and $\mathcal{Y}(\mathcal{A})$, $j \neq i$, be taken as given (exogenous). Consider the deterministic optimization problem:

$$V(0, \mathcal{W}, 0) = \max_{c_i(t)} \left\{ \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \tilde{S}(i, t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t)V(t, \mathcal{W}, j) \right) dt \right\}$$

s.t. $\frac{\partial \mathcal{W}(t, j)}{\partial t} = \left( r + \bar{\mu}_j(t) \right) \mathcal{W}(t, j) - c_j(t) + \sum_{k \neq j} \lambda_{jk}(t) [\mathcal{W}(t, j) - \mathcal{W}(t, k)], j = 1, \ldots, n$

Denote the optimal value-to-go as

$$V(u, \mathcal{W}, 0) = \max_{c_i(t)} \left\{ \int_u^T e^{-\rho t} \tilde{S}(i, t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t)V(t, \mathcal{W}, j) \right) dt \right\}$$

Setting $V(u, \mathcal{W}, 0) = e^{-\rho t} \tilde{S}(i, t)V(t, \mathcal{W}, i)$ then demonstrates that $V(\cdot)$ satisfies the HJB (22) for $i$.

QED

Proof of Appendix Lemma D2:

The costate equations for the Hamiltonian (24) are:

$$p^{(i)}_t = -p^{(i)}_t \left( r + \bar{\mu}_i(t) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) \right) + \sum_{l \neq i} \lambda_{il}(t)p^{(i)}_t$$

and

$$p^{(k)}_t = e^{-\rho t} \tilde{S}(i, t) \lambda_{ik}(t) \frac{\partial V(t, \mathcal{W}, k)}{\partial \mathcal{W}(t, k)} - p^{(k)}_t \left( r + \bar{\mu}_k + \sum_{l \neq k} \lambda_{kl}(t) \right) + \sum_{l \neq k} \lambda_{ik}(t)p^{(i)}_t$$

for $k \neq i$. Suppose that $p^{(k)}_t = 0$, $k \neq i$. (We will verify this at the end of the proof.) This implies:

$$p^{(i)}_t = \theta e^{-\rho t} \tilde{S}(i, t)$$

where $\theta$ is a constant. Note also that the first-order condition of the Hamiltonian with respect to $c_i(t)$ is

$$e^{-\rho t} \tilde{S}(i, t) u_c(c_i(t), q_i(t)) = p^{(i)}_t$$

Setting these last two equations equal to each other then yields the desired result.

To verify that $p^{(k)}_t = 0$, $k \neq i$, note that the previous result implies via the HJB that $\frac{\partial V(t, \mathcal{W}, i)}{\partial \mathcal{W}(t, i)} = \theta e^{-\rho t}$, so that the costate equation for $k \neq i$ is
\[ p_t^{(k)} = -\theta e^{-rt} \hat{s}(i, t) \lambda_{ik}(t) + p_t^{(i)} \lambda_{ik}(t) - p_t^{(k)} \left( r + \bar{\mu}_k + \sum_{l \neq k} \lambda_{kl}(t) \right) + \sum_{l \neq (k, i)} \lambda_{lk}(t) p_t^{(l)} \]

\[ = 0 \]

**QED**

**Proof of Appendix Proposition D3:**

The marginal utility of life extension is defined as

\[ \frac{\partial V}{\partial \epsilon} \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \epsilon} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) - \epsilon \delta(s) ds \right\} \left( u(c_{Y_t}(t), q_Y(t)) - \epsilon \delta(s) ds \right) dt \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} \right] \]

where \( c^* \) represents the equilibrium variation in \( c(t) \) caused by this perturbation. Then

\[ \frac{\partial V}{\partial \epsilon} \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \left( \int_0^t \delta(s) ds \right) \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) ds \right\} u(c_{Y_t}(t), q_Y(t)) \left( c_{Y_t}(t) - \epsilon \delta(s) ds \right) dt \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} \right] \]

\[ = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \left( \int_0^t \delta(s) ds \right) \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) ds \right\} u(c_{Y_t}(t), q_Y(t)) \left( c_{Y_t}(t) - \epsilon \delta(s) ds \right) dt \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} \right] \]

Finally, the budget constraint implies

\[ 0 = \left. \frac{\partial W_0}{\partial \epsilon} \right|_{\epsilon=0} \]

\[ = \left. \frac{\partial}{\partial \epsilon} \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) - \epsilon \delta(s) ds \right\} \left( c_{Y_t}(t) - \epsilon \delta(s) ds \right) dt \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} \right] \]

\[ = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \left( \int_0^t \delta(s) ds \right) \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \mu(s) ds \right\} \left( c_{Y_t}(t) - \epsilon \delta(s) ds \right) dt \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} \right] \]

Plugging this last result into the expression for \( \frac{\partial V}{\partial \epsilon} \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} \) then yields the desired result.

**QED**

**Proof of Appendix Proposition D4:**

Working from equation (23) in the text, the marginal utility of prevention is given by
\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \varepsilon} \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \bar{\mu}(s) + \sum_{j \neq i} [\lambda_{ij}(s) - \varepsilon \delta_{ij}(s)] \, ds \right\} \left( u(c(t), q(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t, j)) \right) dt \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} + \sum_{j \neq i} [\lambda_{ij}(t) - \varepsilon \delta_{ij}(t)] V(t, W(t, j)) dt
\]

where \( c(t) \) and \( W(t) \) represent the equilibrium variations in \( c(t) \) and \( W(t) \) caused by this perturbation. This yields

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \varepsilon} \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} = \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \left( \int_0^t \sum_{j \neq i} \delta_{ij}(s) \, ds \right) \bar{S}(i, t) \left( u(c(t), q(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, W(t, j)) \right) dt
\]

Next, note that the budget constraint implies

\[
0 = \frac{\partial W(t)}{\partial \varepsilon} \bigg|_{\varepsilon=0} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon} \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \exp \left\{ - \int_0^t \bar{\mu}(s) + \sum_{j \neq i} [\lambda_{ij}(s) - \varepsilon \delta_{ij}(s)] \, ds \right\} \left( c(t) - m(t) \right) dt
\]

Substituting in then yields the final result for the marginal utility of the reduction in this transition intensity:
\[
\frac{\partial V / \partial \varepsilon}{\partial V / \partial W} = \int_0^T e^{\rho t} \left( \int_0^t \sum_{j \neq i} \delta_{ij}(s) \, ds \right) \hat{S}(i,t) \left( u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, \overline{W}_{t,j}) \right) \nonumber \\
- e^{\rho t} \hat{S}(i,t) \sum_{j \neq i} \delta_{ij}(t) V(t, \overline{W}_{t,j}) \nonumber \\
- \theta e^{-rt} \left( \int_0^t \sum_{j \neq i} \delta_{ij}(s) \, ds \right) \hat{S}(i,t) \left( c_i(t) - m_i(t) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) \overline{W}(t,j) \right) \nonumber \\
+ \theta e^{-rt} \hat{S}(i,t) \sum_{j \neq i} \delta_{ij}(t) \overline{W}(t,j) \, dt \nonumber \\
= \int_0^T \left( e^{-\rho t} u(c_i(t), q_i(t)) + \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) V(t, \overline{W}_{t,j}) \right) \nonumber \\
\begin{array}{c}
+ \theta e^{-rt} \left( m_i(t) - c_i(t) - \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij}(t) \overline{W}(t,j) \right) \hat{S}(i,t) \\
- \left( e^{-\rho t} \sum_{j \neq i} \delta_{ij}(t) V(t, \overline{W}_{t,j}) - \theta e^{-rt} \sum_{j \neq i} \delta_{ij}(t) \overline{W}(t,j) \right) \hat{S}(i,t) \, dt 
\end{array} 
\]
where $W^{new}$ represents the change in value of the annuity menu purchased in state $i$ when immediately jumping to state $j_0$. Dividing the above expression by the marginal utility of wealth, given by (25), then yields (27), the value of statistical illness (VSI).

QED